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This thesis examines the relationship between migration and economic de-
velopment in Mexico. Chapter 1 examines the effects shocks to destination
labor markets on economic development at home and the welfare of those left
behind. Higher demand for labor in destination countries advances development
by increasing remittance flows, but it may have adverse effects on non-migrants
if their skills complement migrants' skills. Using an empirical strategy that
exploits stickiness in migrants' preferred U.S. destinations, I find that all mem-
bers of Mexican communities benefit from improved labor market conditions
and business opportunities when high U.S. demand induces migrants to leave.
This effect seems to be driven by higher demand for locally-produced goods and
services more than relaxed credit constraints.
Chapter 2 investigates the effects of manufacturing sector development at
home on the migration choices of young Mexican men. Development at home
decreases the net benefit to outmigrtion but may help to relax credit constraints
and finance upfront migration costs. If the latter effect is strong, growth in
the manufacturing sector can actually increase outmigration rates. Using an
instrumental variables strategy based on local industrial composition, however,
I find that local industrial development substantially curbs migration to the
United States even in the poorest areas. Indeed, these estimates imply that the
slowdown in manufacturing growth between the late 1990's and the early 2000's
induced an additional 4.5% of young Mexican men to leave the country.
Chapter 3 extends the theoretical study of optimal relational contracts and
ownership structures to a general equilibrium model with random matching,
focusing particularly on the role played by the relative sizes of the two sides of
the market (market structure). Along with my coauthors, I find that market
structure can affect the sustainability of efficient relational contracts; in the
most interesting case, relational contracts become harder to sustain as the two
sides of market become unbalanced. Since migration has direct effects on market
structure, this chapter highlights a novel channel through which it can influence
economic efficiency in source and destination countries.
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Abstract
Migration from Mexico to the United States constitutes one of the world's
largest labor flows and generates enormous capital flows in the opposite di-
rection. Corresponding to each of these flows is a distinct view of the role
migration plays in local economic development. The optimistic view stresses
the role of remittances in stimulating demand and relaxing credit constraints,
while the pessimistic view emphasizes the departure of the economy's skilled
and motivated workers. Using data from the Mexican Migration Project and
exploiting stickiness in migrants' choice of U.S. destination, I examine the ef-
fects of migrant demand shocks on business ownership and job choice in Mexi-
can communities. I find little evidence to support the pessimistic scenario. All
members of the community, including non-migrants, appear to benefit from
improved labor market and business investment opportunities when high U.S.
demand induces migrants to leave. Demand for local products rather than
credit supply effects seems to be responsible for this outcome.
1 Introduction
Since the 1980's, Mexican workers have experienced a rapid expansion in access to the
U.S. labor market. By the year 2000, 9.4% of Mexico's total population was living in
the United States (Chiquiar & Hanson, 2005), forming one of the world's largest labor
flows. Revealed preference suggests we can assume that this migration is beneficial
for the migrants themselves; however, its effects on those who remain in Mexico
are ambiguous. On the positive side of the ledger, remittances from U.S. migration
constitute roughly 20 billion dollars (Banco de Mexico, 2007), or 2% of Mexican
GDP. These remittances may feed demand for non-tradable goods produced locally,
or they may ease credit constraints and allow capital accumulation to progress. On
the negative side, U.S. migration does not attract a random sample of Mexican
workers. Transient migrants in particular tend to be young and male, and they might
have a different mix of skills and preferences (like risk tolerance) than the general
population as well.' If migrant workers provide important inputs that complement
non-migrants' skills, then their departure could deprive those left behind of economic
opportunities. This ambiguity has been reflected historically in Mexico's migration
policies at the local, state and national level: while past President Vicente Fox
referred to labor migrants as Mexican "heroes", many Mexican governments earlier
'See Chiquiar & Hanson (2005) and Ibarraran & Lubotsky (2007) for evidence that Mexican
migrants are positively selected on education and McKenzie & Rappaport (2006) for an alternative
view.
in the twentieth century had active, if ineffectual, policies to discourage emigration
(Fitzgerald, 2006).
Because most factors that affect emigration will affect origin communities in
many other ways, this issue has been difficult to resolve empirically. Broadly, three
approaches have been tried. First, academics (predominantly in other social sciences)
have conducted detailed qualitative case studies, which usually came to a negative
or ambivalent assessment of the migration process (e.g., Mines & de Janvry, 1982;
Rubenstein, 1992; Jones, 1995). This literature emphasized the departure of a com-
munity's productive members and questioned the likelihood of remittance income
being funneled into investments. Secondly, a substantial body of quantitative re-
search has come out of the Mexican Migration Project, the same data set used in
this paper (Massey, Goldring & Durand, 1994; Durand et al., 1996; Massey & Par-
rado, 1998; Durand et al., 2001). While these papers have contributed substantially
to our understanding of Mexican labor migration, their aims have been primarily
descriptive and not focused on identifying specific causal linkages. Finally, a more
recent literature in economics has attacked the issue with large-scale data sets, ei-
ther through OLS methods (Woodruff & Zenteno, 2001; Unger 2005) or by exploiting
historical variation in the strength of migration networks across different regions of
Mexico (Hanson & Woodruff, 2003; Hildebrandt & McKenzie, 2003; Hanson, 2005).
This last approach has been the most promising, since it is the only one to address
identification issues directly. Nevertheless, it is limited by the fact that the available
measures of historical networks vary only at very coarse geographical level.2
2In both the distant and recent past, labor migration to the United States has been concentrated
in the central-western region of Mexico. Interestingly, emigration rates have not been as high along
most of the border, probably because this is the most prosperous region of the country.
This paper attempts to move the literature forward by employing variation in
migration networks at the level of the individual community. The Mexican Mi-
gration Project (MMP) collects detailed retrospective data with full migration and
employment histories for household heads in selected communities. Previous stud-
ies have shown that overall migration rates are sticky within a community, so that
communities with many migrants in the past will likely have many migrants today. I
show here that communities also display stickiness in their choice of U.S. destination.
Once individuals have established networks in a given locale, it is much less costly
for them, their family members or their acquaintances to return to the same location
on future trips. Despite the diffusion of Mexicans to new U.S. cities during the 1990s
(Card & Lewis, 2007), historical destination patterns successfully predict destination
choices in subsequent decades. Moreover, it has been much more advantageous to
have networks established in some US cities than in others: over 1977-1997, for ex-
ample, employment grew by only 9% in Cook county (Chicago) but by 82% in San
Diego county. Communities with networks in San Diego thus potentially experienced
a much larger increase in demand for migrant labor. By constructing an index based
on historical networks and growth of U.S. destinations, I am able to analyze the
effects of migrant demand on the origin communities.
While I believe that the identification strategy adopted here is a step forward, in
one respect this paper is more modest than the rest of the literature. Rather than
attempting to estimate the effects of "migration" on Mexican economies and non-
migrants,3 I estimate the reduced-form impact of migration demand. Higher demand
3It is not always clear precisely what thought experiment corresponds to "exogenous" shifts in
migration rates. In principle, any factors that affect the benefits or the costs of migration may have
effects on inframarginal migrants. (E.g., better migration networks mean that more individuals will
migrate, but also that each migrant may find work more easily or work of higher quality.)
for migrant workers from a community not only increases the flow of migrants; it
may also raise the wages of existing, inframarginal migrants. Thus the labor outflow
effect depends on the elasticity of migration with respect to U.S. demand, but the
remittance inflow effect depends on the level of migration as well. However, the
wage premium to migration is far larger than any wage increase that inframarginal
migrants will receive, 4 so in practice the bulk of migrant demand effects are likely to
operate through the attraction of additional migrant workers.
I focus on two outcome measures: the occupational distribution in the origin
community to measure labor market opportunities, and business ownership rates to
measure capital investments. I find that increases in demand for migrant workers
from a community leads to occupational upgrading among young workers from new
cohorts that are entering the labor force. Non-migrants seem to benefit from this
upgrading as much as migrants do. Moreover, the effects are substantial: a 10%
increase in the size of the available U.S. employment market is estimated to induce
an additional 1.3% of men age 16-45 to work in the United States and an occupa-
tional shift consistent with 0.67% higher wages among those who do not migrate.
I find similar effects for business investment. The same 10% increase in the size
of the available U.S. market leads to an increase in the business ownership rate of
0.72% among men age 16-45, and once again non-migrants are no less likely to start
businesses than migrants. The bulk of the evidence presented in this paper, then,
supports the optimistic view of international migration: not only do migrants bene-
fit from increased access to the U.S. labor market, but their communities and those
who stay behind benefit as well. This paper also suggests a particular causal channel
through which non-migrant members of the community benefit. Broadly, U.S. re-
4I estimate a premium of 274%.
mittances can promote development at home either by stimulating demand for local
products (Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny, 1989) or by relaxing credit constraints (Stark,
1991). While no one piece is definitive, I present multiple strands of evidence that
consistently point to product demand as the dominant explanation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the effects
of migrant demand on economic activity in Mexican communities in the context of
a simple neoclassical model. Surprisingly, calibration of this model already suggests
that the pessimistic scenario will be unlikely to occur. Section 3 introduces the
Mexican Migration Project (MMP) and presents some features of migration patterns
in the MMP data. Section 4 builds up the estimating equations from a simple model
of labor markets in US destinations, showing how the regression estimates are related
to structural parameters. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6
concludes.
2 The Effects of Migration Demand on Non-Migrant
Workers
2.1 Neoclassical Model
U.S. demand for Mexican workers affects communities through three basic channels:
by increasing the supply of capital via remittance inflows, by increasing demand for
locally-produced goods via remittance inflows,5 and by drawing a selected subset
5Emigration could reduce local demand if migrants spent the vast majority of their income in
the United States. Empirically, transient migrants seem to have higher consumption level in their
home communities than similar non-migrants.
of the population away. The first two channels are likely to benefit non-migrant
households, while the last may be harmful if migrant and non-migrant labor are
complementary. In this subsection, I develop an illustrative neoclassical model that
analyzes the net effect of migrant demand shocks on non-migrant wages. Other
effects that arise from credit constraints are discussed informally in subsection 3.
Consider an infinite horizon, discrete time economy with two intermediate goods,
one final good that can be used for either consumption or investment, and three
factors of production. One intermediate good is produced locally at price PL, while
the other is supplied elastically from outside the community at price 1. Production of
the local good uses capital and two types of worker, "M-type" (or potential migrant)
workers in quantity LM and "N-type" (or non-migrant) workers in quantity LN.
Each period, the factors of production are combined according to the nested CES
production function
YL = [aKc + (1 - a)LC]1 / C (1)
L = [yLL + (1 - y)LP] 11P  (2)
where C, p < 1. Each factor of production is paid the value of its marginal product,
so
r = aYl-CKC-lpL
WM = (1- a)jY1-CLCL-PL PL
WN = (1 - a)(1 - -)Y1-CLC-PL PpL (3)
where r is the return to capital, wM is the local wage of migrant workers, and WN is
the wage of non-migrant workers.'
N-type workers face infinite migration costs and will never choose to work in the
United States. LN is thus the total stock of N-type workers. M-types, however, can
choose to work in the U.S. at a wage wM > wM if they pay an idiosyncratic migration
cost ci, distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F(ci). Worker i
chooses to migrate if and only if wM - WM > ci, so that the proportion of M-types in
the United States will be F(wM - WM). Denote by LM the total stock of non-migrant
workers and by M the number who choose to migrate to the U.S.; LM LM + M.
Once production has taken place and income has been received, worker i combines
YLit units of the local good and YFit units of the imported good to produce the final
good according to the Cobb-Douglas production function Yit = Yit -  iit
where mit is an indicator variable for migration to the United States by individual i
in period t. This final good is then consumed or saved to maximize the intertemporal
utility function
- o -0 t 1 C 1I-0= Z 1 _- 10
t=O
subject to the law of motion for wealth, Wit+1 = rWit + wit - PLCLit - CFit (assuming
that all wealth is invested into capital and that capital depreciates fully in one
period). Letting I = PLYL + M M = WNLN + WMLM + rK + wm M denote aggregate
income, this utility function implies that aggregate consumption levels in period t
6 Time subscripts are suppressed for notational clarity.
are
CLt = A(1 - st)It
OFt = (1-A)(1-st)It
where s is the fraction of wealth is saved. The savings rate st is chosen such that the
consumption path follows the standard formula~ rC
-+ /Pit+1 = Ct-/pt, where P0t
is the shadow price of the final good in period t. In steady state, savings-and the
capital stock-will set
pr(K) = aPY_(- K-lpL = 1 (4)
That is, capital will be accumulated until its rate of return equals the rate at which
consumers discount the future.
The final equation necessary to close the system is the determination of PL. The
domestic economy exports labor and imports YF. In steady state, the local economy
must be in financial equilibrium with the outside world, so that inflows of remit-
tances are equal to spending on goods produced outside the community. This means
that higher remittance levels will lower the relative price of imported goods, raising
the price of (non-tradable) goods produced locally. To capture this relationship in a
simple way, I assume that all U.S. income returns as remittances, or that no consump-
tion takes place while working abroad.'In that case, the value of local production in
7This assumption is not important for the qualitative conclusions. It can be interpreted to mean
that only foreign goods are consumed in the United States, and migrants then "make up" their
consumption of local Mexican goods upon their return.
period t must equal spending on YL in period t, or
PLtYLt = Alt
PLtYLt AWMMt (5)
Equations (1)-(5) determine a unique solution to the model's steady state equi-
librium. While the solution does not have a closed form representation, the elasticity
of N-type wages with respect to U.S. wages does have a closed form. However, be-
cause it is complex and provides limited intuition, I leave it to the appendix. A more
intuitive expression for the effect of U.S. wages on demand for non-migrants' labor
is given by
dwN/IWN dpL/pL d(K/L)/(K/L) dL/L
dwM/wM= (1 - A) + (1 - dw M + (1 - p) (6)
dwM/w" dw"/wM dwM/w" dw"/w"
where I define
aK(
a aKC + (1 
- a)LC
as capital's share of domestic income. The change in aggregate labor supply can be
distilled into its primitive components; since LN remains fixed,
dL/L ( LM dLM/LM
dwM / wM L dw M / wM
M
•7M Lm
where l77 is the elasticity of migration with respect to U.S. wages and ' is the share
of M-types in the domestic wage bill:
^yLP
Y = TL + (1 - y)L 
Equation (6) decomposes the total effect of U.S. demand into its three constituent
parts. The first term gives the direct effect of increased demand for the locally-
produced good. Holding other factors of production fixed, higher demand for local
goods benefits those who work in the domestic sector. The second term is the effect
of increased capital intensity, which also raises demand for N-type labor. In this
model with complete markets, capital intensity is increasing in wM solely through
the higher price of the local good. Inspection of equation (4) shows that for constant
PL, YL/K is fixed, which implies that K/L must be fixed as well. In steady state,
the capital-intensity of the local economy and the relative price of local goods must
move together; the profitability of investment is a direct function of PL. The final
term captures the labor-draining effect of U.S. demand. Because M-type labor is
an imperfect substitute for N-type labor, the exit of additional migrants depresses
non-migrants' share of wages. This effect is always negative, and it is strongest when
M-type and N-type labor are very complementary, i.e., p << 0.
The conditions under which the labor-draining effect dominates are not trans-
parent. However, I show in the appendix that the net effect of U.S. wages on WN is
negative when
A h(aA,() 1+ h(, , ) - 1 + rM LAI (7)1 - -( (7)
-TIM M
The effects of all parameters on the likelihood of a negative non-migrant wage effect
therefore depend on the partial derivatives of g(.). It is straightforward to verify that
1. g(.) decreasing in -: when capital is more important in the production process,
complementarity between labor and capital tends to dominate any potential
complementarity between different types of labor. This makes it less likely for
U.S. demand to harm non-migrant workers.
2. g(.) is increasing in 9: when M-type workers are relatively important to the
domestic labor force, the labor-draining effect is accentuated.
3. g(-) is increasing in A: when the local good is relatively more important, the
positive direct effects of PL on real wages are smaller.
4. g(.) is increasing in (: when capital and labor are more substitutable, the
positive effects of capital accumulation are muted.
5. g(.) is increasing in riM: more elastic migration responses accentuate the labor-
draining effects of U.S. demand but leave the level of increased remittances
from inframarginal migrants unaffected.
2.2 Calibration
Many of the parameters in equation (7) can be approximated. In this section, I
calibrate the model developed above to plausible parameters to determine whether
the net effect of U.S. demand on non-migrant wages is likely to be negative. This
exercise suggests that the pessimistic scenario of declining non-migrant wages is
unlikely on theoretical grounds.
I make the following parametric assumptions:
1. I set the share of capital in domestic income to ' =
2. I set the share of M-type workers in the domestic wage bill to y = . The
empirical analysis below indicates that past migrants and non-migrants receive
similar wages in their home community. In this case, y is approximately equal
to LM/LN. In the MMP sample, 61.2% of all men age 16-45 have worked in
the United States at some point, and 11.0% are in the United States in any
given year. If we denote men who have ever been the U.S. as M-types and the
others as N-types, then LM/LN . ".8
3. For the same reasons, I set LM/M = 3.
4. I lack data to estimate A. For want of a better alternative, I use A = as a
reasonable guess and A = 1 as a polar case that maximizes g(-).
5. The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is 1/(1 - (); I set this
equal to 1 (the Cobb-Douglas case) or 2 (a conservative estimate that weakens
sSome young men will be M-types who have not yet had a chance to travel to the United States,
which suggests that - should be higher. On the other hand, I am omitting all women and older
men from the relevant labor force. These groups migrate at much lower rates than young men, so
their omission biases - upward (i.e., they contribute relatively more to LN than to LM).
the effect of capital accumulation on wN). These choices imply 0 = and
( = 0.5 respectively.
6. I set rlM = 1 and TrI = 00. The migration estimates in Section 5 suggest
that the elasticity of migration with respect to destination employment levels
is on the order of unity. This implies that Mexicans' migration elasticity is
similar to the internal migration elasticity of U.S. workers (see equation 8).
The U.S. labor economics literature lacks firm estimates of this elasticity, but
Borjas (2006) finds that the wage response and the American labor supply
response to an immigrant supply shock are of similar magnitudes at the state
level, which implies an internal migration elasticity of 1. Internal migration at
the metropolitan level is likely more elastic than migration at the state level,
however, so the true value of 7rm may be above 1. I use rlM= oc as a polar
case that maximizes the labor-draining effect.
Many of these assumptions are rough, but I attempt to err toward overestimating
g(.), i.e., overestimating the likelihood of a negative effect on WN. The maximum
values of p that lead to negative effects on WN are displayed in the first two columns
of Table 1. Depending on the parameters used, the thresholds range from -9.56
to -1.00. In all cases, the local demand effect dominates the labor-draining effect
except for extreme degrees of complementarity between M-type and N-type labor. In
part, the explanation lies with two simplifying assumptions of the model developed
in subsection 1: that U.S. income is spent on local goods in the same proportion
as domestic incomes, and that labor migration is the only source of earnings for
acquiring the imported good YF. Together, these assumptions imply that PL (and
the capital stock) must react starkly to increases in U.S. earnings in order to maintain
a financial equilibrium with the outside world. Indeed, when 1/(1 - 1) = , A = 23,
and qM = 1, the model implies that the elasticity of K with respect to wM is 2,9 and
this figure does not vary substantially with alternative parameter choices.
To relax these assumptions, I modify the model in two ways. First, I allow a
fraction 7 of U.S. earnings to be spent abroad prior to arrival in Mexico; none of
this spending is directed at the good YL. Secondly, I allow the community to have
a fixed export income X in addition to remittance income.'o For simplicity, I take
this level of income to be exogenous-in particular, it is unrelated to the level of U.S.
labor demand. With these two modifications, equation (5) is replaced by
PLtYLt = [(1 - r)wM"Mt + X] (5')
The rest of the model remains the same. The consequence of these changes is to
attenuate the effect of U.S. earnings on local demand by a factor
(1 - 7)WMM
(1 - )w + X
or the share of labor exports in the value of total exports from the community. Now
equation (7) is replaced by
1 + h(-, A, C) - A 1 + 7,M L
fA MA(7')
7 TIM M
9 dKIK _ 1+ M[I+C(1-&)jM/LM
dwM WM -
1 0
"Export" income here refers to goods sold outside of the community. There is no requirement
that the goods be sold internationally.
The remaining columns of Table 1 display the cutoff values of p when V = 0.5 and
when V = 0.25. The thesholds are noticeably larger, ranging from -4.56 to 0.19.
Nevertheless, even for the polar parameter values A = 1 and 7rM = o, they continue
to require much more complementarity across M-type and N-type labor than between
capital and labor as a whole, a condition that seems unlikely to hold.
2.3 Discussion
According to the model presented above, the welfare consequences of U.S. demand
for non-migrants depend on the balance between two forces: the positive effect that
arises from the role of remittances in stimulating local demand, and the negative
effect that comes from the drain of potentially complementary types of workers. The
calibration exercise suggests that the positive effect will dominate if this simple model
is accurate. However, two more subtle implications are worth noting. First, capital
accumulation is an important mediating variable through which local demand in-
creases non-migrant wages. We can therefore look to business investment as well as
to the labor market for evidence on non-migrant welfare. If higher levels of migrant
demand lead to substantially greater levels of investment, we should be more confi-
dent that non-migrants are in fact better off. This will be an important component
of my empirical strategy given the limitations of my measure of labor market out-
comes. Secondly, higher wages are entirely driven by local demand for goods in this
model. While the baseline version does not contain an exportable good, the share
of exports in local production will rise in the extended model discussed in subsec-
tion 2. In other words, high U.S. demand should lead to a shift in the occupational
distribution toward non-tradeable sectors like services and construction.
While the model with complete markets can capture the countervailing effects
of U.S. demand on local Mexican labor markets, it fails to capture one prominent
mechanism discussed both anecdotally and academically: the role of migration in
relieving credit constraints. When credit markets are imperfect, higher demand for
migrants can relieve constraints both by increasing the incomes of inframarginal mi-
grants and by inducing more individuals to work in the U.S. That is, wM might affect
the supply side of the capital market as well as the demand side. If so, the capital-
labor ratio will rise by more than the perfect markets model predicts, reinforcing the
positive effects of U.S. demand on non-migrant welfare. However, the "credit push"
theory is empirically distinguishable from the "demand pull" theory. Under the for-
mer, additional business investments should be concentrated among M-types, since
they are the ones who receive the bulk of the financial windfall.llUnder the latter,
all individuals face the same increase in investment profitability, and so there is no
reason to expect that non-migrants will invest any less than migrants. Moreover, the
credit push theory also suggests a particular pattern to the gross flows of business
activity: on the assumption that individuals who already own a business are not
(or are much less) credit constrained, the effects of U.S. demand should appear as
positive effects on business openings with no significant negative effect on business
closings. If instead U.S. demand is operating through demand for local goods, we
should expect to observe a response along both margins.
I begin the empirical analysis by introducing the data (Section 3) and by pre-
senting an empirical model that explains my measure of migrant demand in terms
of structural parameters (Section 4). Section 5.1 confirms that this measure does in
fact predict migration rates and discusses selection of migrants in the MMP data.
"Non-migant wages may increase, but any reasonable increase will be trivial compared to the
cross-border wage gain of M-types who are induced to migrate.
The heart of the welfare analysis comes in Section 5.2, where I construct an index
of occupational quality based on each occupation's wage premium. I use this index
to examine the effects of migrant demand on occupational upgrading and downgrad-
ing among both the population at large and among non-migrants specifically, and I
find that higher levels of U.S. demand lead to stronger labor market outcomes for all
community members. Section 5.2 also looks at shifts in the occupational distribution
across tradeable and non-tradeable sectors and finds some evidence in favor of the
demand pull over the credit push hypothesis. Section 5.3 moves on to business activ-
ity. I confirm the results of Section 5.2 by showing that higher U.S. demand leads to
higher rates of business ownership. I also exploit information on the migrant status of
new business operators and on rates of business openings versus business closings to
strengthen the case against credit supply as the primary mechanism through which
the demand for migrants operates. Section 5.4 suggests that employment rates of
secondary workers increase in response to U.S. demand, which I interpret as a final
piece of evidence in favor of a robust market for non-migrant labor.
3 Data
3.1 The Mexican Migration Project
The Mexican Migration Project is a collaborative effort between researchers at Prince-
ton University and the University of Guadalajara. Beginning in 1982, the project
has selected a small number of locations to sample in December and January of each
year, when many migrants return home. As of 2004, 107 communities had been sur-
veyed, ranging from small villages to neighborhoods of large cities and covering most
regions within the country. Although the communities are chosen purposefully (i.e.,
not randomly) to represent a broad cross-section of Mexico, households within each
community are chosen at random. The core of the survey is a detailed life history
for both the household head and spouse, which covers work, domestic and interna-
tional migration, business operation, property ownership, land ownership, marriage,
fertility, and education in each year up to the survey date. The survey also collects
more limited information about first and last migrations and the migratory behavior
of other household members.
The MMP is a valuable resource because it provides a pseudo-panel of economic
activity within each community. Indeed, to my knowledge it is the only survey that
contains information on historical migration destinations at the local level. However,
two limitations of these data should be noted. First, the MMP is a quasi-panel of in-
dividuals rather than communities, and communities are surveyed at different points
in time. This means that the average age of a community sample in year t will vary
with the survey year; many outcomes show strong and non-linear age profiles. More-
over, there is some tendency for the communities surveyed in the 1980's to be focused
in high-migration states, while the communities surveyed more recently were chosen
to "round out" the sample. Insofar as migrant demand increased differentially over
time by survey year, there is a risk of confounding the effects of demand with non-
linearities in age profiles. I address this concern below by estimating all regressions
at the individual level with a full set of age dummies. Secondly, the MMP sample
is selected endogenously because long-term or permanent migrants are necessarily
excluded. The project staff attempt to minimize this bias by conducting surveys in
the winter months and returning to households where the respondent was missing. 12
12Snowball samples of migrants who have settled in the US and originate in the sampled com-
Plausibly, increases in US demand for migrant labor induce households to substitute
permanent for temporary migration. If so, the results below will understate the ex-
tent to which migration responds to demand. More concerning is the potential for
bias in the measures of economic outcomes. Here the direction of bias will depend
primarily on whether the individuals with a propensity for permanent migration are
more or less upwardly mobile than average. If permanent migrants are drawn from
poorer households but have the potential to rapidly climb the economic ladder, then
their absence from the sample will bias the estimates to make U.S. demand shocks
appear more negative than they are. On the other hand, if permanent migrants are
drawn from relatively affluent households but then fail to progress over their lifetime,
their absence will bias the estimates in a positive direction.
For the most part, I focus on male household heads who were born and surveyed
in Mexico and are 16-75 years old. I further restrict the sample to communities
containing at least 20 person-year observations with employment in the US (this is
necessary in order to construct a reliable demand measure; see below). This leaves
75 communities. Table 2 lists some descriptive statistics for this sample from 1977
onward, with each person-year weighted equally. Approximately 9.5% of the person-
years are spent in the US; migration is much more common among the young, though
this is obscured in the data by the fact that the MMP sampled lower-migration
communities in later years."1 Business ownership rates are not trivial at 16.1%, with
higher rates among older migrants. These businesses are primarily retail-stores and
street vending, with a minority of small manufacturing establishments and service
munity are collected as well. I exclude these observations on the grounds that it is impossible to
determine whether they are representative of all settled migrants.
13Communities sampled earlier contribute more person-year observations to the sample of men
age 16-45: men who were older at the time of the survey are still included in the young sample for
years prior to their 46th birthday.
providers. Agriculture and manufacturing occupations are the most common both
in Mexico and in the US, though the distribution of migrant jobs is noticeably more
tilted toward agriculture. On average, heads with migratory experience report that
their last trip to the US lasted a full two years, but this reflects a skewed distribution:
the median duration is 8 months.
While migrant networks have historically been concentrated in a few US destina-
tions, the MMP data show a long tail. Table Al orders destinations by their share of
pre-1977 person-years with jobs in the US. Los Angeles is by far the most common
destination (21.0%), followed by Chicago (8.2%) and Merced (6.6%). At the state
level, networks were heavily concentrated in California, with some in Illinois and
Texas and very little elsewhere. These networks seem to affect subsequent migration
behavior. Table 3 shows the rank correlation between the share of US person-years
in each of the top 15 destinations before 1977 and the share of person-years in that
destination from 1977 onward. The correlations range from .254 to .741 and are
always significant. Moreover, this does not seem to reflect merely the same indi-
viduals returning to their old destinations. When I split the sample into "young"
and "old" migrants by age in the survey year, the destination choices of the young
from 1977 onward remain strongly correlated with the destination choices of the old
before 1977, though the relationship is weaker. The finding that networks influence
migration behavior is in line with a large body of prior work (Card, 2001; Munshi,
2003) and justifies the empirical strategy of this paper.
3.2 County Business Patterns
I draw data on the size of the top 38 US destinations from the County Business
Patterns (CBP) for 1977-2004. The CBP give total employment in each US county
in each year. I associate each destination with employment in its "core" county,14
listed in Table A2; typically the city is the county seat. An alternative would have
been to use all counties in the relevant metropolitan area. However, because migrant
jobs tend to be concentrated in urban centers rather than suburbs, the size of the
core county economy is likely to provide a more accurate measure of the demand for
migrant workers.
4 Empirical Model
In this section, I briefly sketch an empirical model that translates my measure of
migrant demand into structural parameters. We can think of each U.S. destination
as an economy that combines American labor, Mexican labor and other factors to
produce output. Assume that this production technology is homogeneous of degree
1 and that all non-labor factors are perfectly elastic in supply at the local level; in
that case we can imagine output as a constant returns to scale function of American
and Mexican labor. For illustrative purposes, let this production function be CES:
Ydt = Adt(rN9 + (1 - )Md)M)1/'
where Y is output, N is native American labor, M is Mexican migrant labor, d in-
dexes US destinations and t indexes the year. Assume factors are paid their marginal
products and that each destination receives shocks to Adt over time. These shocks
14In two cases, I use a pair of counties because it is difficult to determine which one is the "core".
Riverside county is paired with San Bernardino county, and Solano county is paired with Napa
county.
affect the wages of Americans and Mexican migrants, who both respond by adjust-
ing their supply. Let r', - 0 In Ndt/O In wN be the elasticity of supply of American
labor to a particular destination, and let q M a In Mdtla/ In wM be the elasticity of
Mexican labor. Allowing factor supplies to adjust, the response of migrant wages in
d to a productivity shock is
dw/w (1
dAdt/Adt 1 + (1 - V)[Vdt7gN + (1 - Vdt)T)M]
where Vdt is the share of income received by migrants.
Consider the effect of a vector of productivity shocks on the average migrant
wage offer within a Mexican community. As an approximation, suppose that the
productivity shocks are sufficiently small that they do not alter the distribution of
preferred U.S. destinations among the community's potential migrants. In that case,
the effect of d's productivity shock will be proportional to the number of individuals
in the community for whom d is the most preferred destination; call the proportion
from community c who prefer destination d nTdt. Then the effect of a vector of
productivity shocks on the average migrant wage offer for community c is
M-dw/w M
A In ! =d nt dwt A In Adt
dn M dAdt/Adt
In practice, I do not observe productivity shocks. Instead, I infer them from
changes in the size of a destination's labor market, Edt = Mdt + Ndt. Assuming that
the proportion of migrants in each destination's labor force is small, we can rewrite
the change in the migrant wage offer as
Alnjw = (1 ndtA In Edt (8)
CM 1 + (1 - ))T d
Because the MMP data do not contain information on Wdt or ncdt, 15 my measure
of migrant demand Dct is instead
Dt = dPc In(Edt)
which differs from equation (8) in two respects. First, I omit the constant that
depends on (rM, r7M, V). Thus effects of Dt are proportional to effects of migrant
wage offers up to an unknown constant that is is decreasing in the elasticity of both
American and Mexican labor supplies. In other words, I estimate a reduced form
relationship, where the missing first stage between wage offers and demand shocks is a
known function of unknown parameters. '" Secondly, I substitute Pcd for ncdt, where
Pcd is constructed as follows: I collect all pre-1977 person-years where a (current)
Mexican-born male household head was working in one of the 38 most common US
destinations; these are the destinations that account for at least 0.25% of pre-1977
person-years spent working in a known US location. The share of such person-years
spent in location d among residents of community c is pcd, which I treat as constant
over time.
1 5The MMP collects data on migrants' wages during their first and last trip to the US. However,
the timing of these trips is very likely to be endoegenous, making selection bias severe.
16In principle, it would be possible to estimate migrants' wage changes in each city using US
data. However, even the US census samples contain a small number of recent Mexican migrants in
each destination, and they are available only once per decade. While noisy, estimates on Census
data (not reported) do suggest that destination growth is associated with higher wages for Mexican
immigrants in general.
Intuitively, changes in Dt represent proportional changes in the size a "synthetic
destination", comprising each US destination weighted by its share of of pre-1977
migration networks. Note that absolute growth in the number of jobs in a US city
has a much stronger effect if that city is small, provided it still accounts for a large
share of the historical network. This reflects the presumption that new jobs are more
likely to be available to migrants where they account for a larger fraction of the labor
force.
For any outcome Yit , my baseline specification of the relationship between Yit
and demand for migrants Dd is
Yiact = 3Dt + 7- + bt +Ca + Eiact (9)
where "y is a community fixed effect, 6 t is a year fixed effect, and (a is an age fixed
effect. I estimate equation (9) by pooling all person-years where an individual's
age fell in the appropriate range (typically 16-45 or 46-75). In some regressions, a
household fixed effect replaces the community fixed effect; this excludes effects that
operate through outcome changes across cohorts.
To account for correlation across individuals within a community-year and serial
correlation over time, I cluster all standard errors at the community level. This
procedure may be overly conservative; while serial correlation is surely a factor, it
is unlikely to have an unrestricted form over 20 years or more. Clustering at the
community level may fail to make use of some of the independence in the data, but
I retain it in favor of GLS, which may bias standard errors downward (Bertrand,
Duflo & Mullainathan, 2004).
There are at least three potential sources of bias in estimating 3. First, the CBP
data on total employment measures Edt = Mdt + Ndt; because this measure includes
migrant workers it is potentially endogenous. However, the proportion of workers
coming from a particular source community is a very small share of the destination
labor market, and so this endogeneity is likely to be negligible. It would be a concern
only in the presence of a migration supply shock that was correlated with the dis-
tribution of US destinations in each community's network (e.g., a migration supply
shock that hits all communities with strong networks in San Diego and not others).
Note that unobserved shocks that affect the productivity of a city's economy are
not a source of bias. There is no presumption that destination employment per se
affects the demand for migrants, and I interpret total employment as a proxy for
factors that affect marginal products at a destination. Secondly, because the MMP
captures only a sample of pre-1977 migration, Dt is measured with error, and this
error is decreasing in the number of pre-1977 migrations. I attempt to minimize
this bias by excluding all communities with fewer than 20 migratory person-years in
the pre-period. Finally, it is possible that destination growth is not a random shock
but is instead correlated with unobservable and time-varying community character-
istics. It is difficult to imagine a concrete story where this is true, but it can never
be tested directly. However, I address this concern by testing whether community
characteristics are correlated with future demand growth and checking the results
for robustness to community-specific time trends.
5 Results
5.1 Migration
I first show that the demand measure Dt does predict changes in migrant activity
over time. The first two columns of Table 4 display results from a pooled regression
where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating residence in the United States
in a given person-year. Migration does respond to changes in destination market
size among young men (ages 16-45) but has no clear effect among older men (ages
46-75). This is not because older men fail to migrate in general; the overall rate
of US migration is 6.4% among the older men in the sample, less than the 11% for
younger men but not trivial. However, migration does appear to be starkly less elastic
at higher ages, which may reflect the fact that older men with previous migration
experience have established access to US labor markets and are not dependent on
the creation of new jobs.
Quantitatively, we see that a 10% increase in destination size is associated with
a 1.28% increase in the probability of migration for young men. Given average mi-
gration rates in the sample, these figures translate into elasticities of migrant supply
with respect to native employment slightly above 1. In other words, young Mexican
men are just as responsive as U.S. natives to productivity shocks in American cities.
This elastic supply response gives us some reason to believe that U.S. demand shocks
will not have large income effects for inframarginal migrants, i.e., U.S. demand in-
creases remittance incomes primarily by increasing the quantity of migration, not by
increasing its price.
The estimates in columns (1) and (2) combine the effects of US demand on the
attraction of new migrants with its effects on the retention of individuals already
working in the United States. The remaining columns of the table attempt to dis-
entangle these two mechanisms. Columns (3) and (4) restrict the sample to person-
years where the individual was not in the United States the previous year, while
columns (5) and (6) restrict the sample to person-years where the individual was
in the United States one year prior. These two samples partition the set of person-
years, but not the set of individuals: the same individual can appear in both samples
in different years. While these estimates are noisy, they suggest that higher migrant
demand increases both the likelihood of beginning work in the U.S. (columns 3 and
4) and the likelihood of remaining in the U.S. for those already there (columns 5 and
6). (The point estimates for the sample of t - 1 migrants are larger by about a factor
of 10, but the raw likelihood of working in the United States is approximately 10
times larger for those who worked there in the previous year.) Columns (7) through
(10) repeat the same exercise but partition the sample into person-years where the
individual either was not (columns 7 and 8) or was (columns 9 and 10) in the United
States 10 years prior. Here the results for young men are statistically significant, but
more importantly they again confirm that both the migrant attraction and migrant
retention mechanisms are operating.
Table 5 presents evidence on migrant selection. The sample covers men age 16-75
who were employed in Mexico at the time of the survey. Some of these men had
migrated to the United States in the past, and I regress the MMP's measure of an-
nual earnings in the current domestic job on a dummy for status as a past migrant.'
17More precisely, the MMP collected data on the household head's income or wages for commu-
nities 1-52 and data on the wage rate in the head's last formal domestic job for communities 53
onward. All regressions use community fixed effects, which should absorb differences between these
two earnings measures. Households also report income or wages at various frequencies; I convert all
data to an annual measure assuming 8 hours of work per day, 5 days per week, 4 weeks per month,
Surprisingly, perhaps, past migrants are negatively selected in this sample, with av-
erage earnings around 4% lower. The migrant wage penalty disappears entirely with
controls for years of education; this suggests that it is not explained by a model of se-
lective return migration where migrants who receive new negative information about
their skill return to Mexico, while those who receive positive information remain in
the United States (and out of the MMP sample). If this kind of selective return
migration were occurring, it would likely operate along unobservable dimensions of
skill as well as years of schooling. The finding that migrants are negatively selected
on education contrasts starkly with Chiquiar & Hanson (2005), who find that immi-
grants from Mexico are drawn from the upper middle of the educational distribution.
Part of the explanation likely lies with the omission of permanent migrants from the
MMP. Work in the U.S. agricultural sector is complementary to temporary migration
because it tends to be seasonal, and it demands a relatively low level of skill. The
difference in time periods may also play a role, since Chiquiar & Hanson focus on the
period from 1990 onward while the sample for Table 5 covers a much longer span. In
any event, the fact that migrants in the MMP do not seem to be the cream of their
communities is consistent with the weak evidence for the labor-draining effect that
I find below.
5.2 Occupational Quality
While the MMP does not contain a panel of earnings, it does contain a full life
history of each head's occupation by year at the 3-digit level. In this section, I
examine the effect of U.S. demand for migrants on the occupational distribution
and 12 months per year.
of Mexican communities, measuring occupational quality by log wage occupational
premia from a cross-sectional regression. If a group of workers moves into better-
paying occupations, we can infer that they likely experienced an expansion of their
labor market opportunities.
In order to increase precision, I first group the 3-digit occupations into 31 cat-
egories. The categories were selected such that each one contains at least 50 wage
observations from the survey year. Table A3 presents the occupational distribution
in the survey year for past migrants and non-migrants respectively. Agriculture is
by far the most common occupation for both groups, but the remainder is spread
broadly across skilled and unskilled manufacturing as well as service occupations.
Consistent with their lower average years of schooling, past migrants are overrep-
resented in agriculture and underrepresented in most "high skill" occupations (like
professionals, educators or administrators).
In Table A4, I estimate a regression of log earnings in the survey year on dummies
for each of 30 occupations (agriculture is the excluded occupation), with education,
age and community fixed effects."8 Workers in agriculture have much lower wages
than workers in almost all other occupations, even controlling for education, age and
community. An unskilled construction worker, for example, earns about 30% more
in the MMP than a similar worker in agriculture. 19For the most part, the pattern of
the other estimates lines up with intuitive expectations: professionals, administrators
and retail merchants earn much more than unskilled laborers, domestic workers, or
"
8 For this and all subsequent earnings regressions, I windsorize earnings at each community's 5th
and 95th percentiles.
l"This is not simply an artifact of agricultural workers consuming their own production, since the
MMP specifically asks for earnings from work for wages. Individuals who do not work for wages
are dropped from the regression.
retail workers.
The previous regression excludes workers who are working in the U.S. at the
time of the survey. In order to establish a benchmark analysis of the labor market
consequences of U.S. demand, including consequences for migrant workers as well as
for non-migrants, I estimate the migration earnings premium in a separate regression.
The MMP contains information on each migrant's wage in his last U.S. job; for past
migrants who are currently employed in Mexico, a domestic Mexican wage is also
reported. I therefore construct a sample containing two earnings observations for
each past migrant, one in the U.S. and one in Mexico (with U.S. earnings converted
to pesos at average exchange rate in the relevant year). By regressing log earnings
on age, year and household fixed effects, I obtain an estimated premium of 1.32 log
points (or a wage approximately 3.74 times as high) when the same individual is
working in the U.S. This is a premium relative to the average migrant's domestic
occupation. In order to make it comparable to the 30 occupational premia, I use
the distribution of migrant occupations given in Table A3 to obtain an estimated
premium of 1.53 log points relative to employment in Mexican agriculture. I treat
migration to the United States as a 32nd possible occupation, with a wage premium
of 1.53.
I use these occupational premia to construct an index of job quality for each
person-year in the MMP sample: job quality of person i in year t is equal to the
wage premium associated with person i's occupation in year t, where any job in
the U.S. is assigned to the migration occupation. I then regress job quality on
migrant demand with community, age and year fixed effects in Table 6. Column
(1) gives a benchmark estimate for men age 16-45, incorporating all person-years
(including person-years spent as a migrant) into the sample. On average, a 10%
expansion in destination employment is associated with an occupational premium
2.4% higher at the origin for men age 16-45. This figure measures the overall benefit
to Mexican workers when U.S. demand is high, but it is dominated by the mechanical
effect of U.S. demand on the number of workers who migrate. Column (2) focuses
on non-migrant workers by excluding from the sample any individual who is ever
observed to work in the United States up until the survey date (i.e., all person-
years are excluded for any person who migrates). While some of these men may
migrate in the future, the sample should contain a much higher proportion of "N-
types", and none of these men can have benefitted directly from migration thus
far. The point estimate falls by more than two thirds relative to column (1), but
it remains statistically and economically significant: a 10% increase in destination
size is associated with a 0.7% increase in mean occupational wages for all young men
who do not migrate. Column (3) adds migrants back to the sample but excludes
those person-years actually spent in the United States. It differs from column (2)
in two respects. First, the point estimate reflects the domestic job prospects of
migrants as well as those of non-migrants. Secondly, it is biased upward, because
migrant workers are underrepresented in the community in years when U.S. demand
is high and migrants are negatively selected. Despite its upward bias, however, the
estimate in column (3) is smaller than the estimate in column (2), which suggests
that U.S. demand actually improves the domestic job quality of non-migrants more
than the domestic job quality of migrants. Column (4) returns to the sample of
non-migrants from column (2) but adds household fixed effects to the specification.
This effectively reduces the estimate to 0. That is, a given individual does not seem
to move into "better" occupations on average when his community experiences a
positive migrant demand shock. Instead, the positive effect from column (2) arises
from new cohorts of young men who enter higher-paying occupations than they
otherwise would have. Nevertheless, there is tentative evidence that U.S. demand
does cause some occupational shifting within a particular household. Column (5)
repeats the specification from column (4) but excludes all person-years where the
individual was working in agriculture. Here we see weak evidence of workers shifting
into slightly worse occupations when migrant demand goes up, conditional on neither
shifting out nor shifting into agriculture. This result is mirrored in column (1) of
Table 7, where we see some evidence of households shifting from agriculture to other
occupations. In other words, (non-migrant) workers seem to shift from both the
worst-paid occupation (agriculture) and the best-paid occupations toward middling
occupations when migrant demand increases.
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 6 present household fixed effect estimates for two other
groups: men age 46-75 and women age 16-45. Neither of these groups seems to be
responsive to migrant demand (in the women's case because they migrate at very
low rates). The point estimates indicate a modest positive effect on occupational
quality for the older men and a substantial negative effect for the young women, but
neither is statistically significant.
In Table 7, I divide the occupations into three categories: agriculture, manufac-
turing and transportation (excluding construction), and services (including construc-
tion). I interpret the last category as non-tradables, the second category as tradables,
and agriculture as a traditional sector. Columns (1) through (3) regress a dummy
for each broad occupational category on migrant demand, along with fixed effects
for age, year and household, in a sample of non-migrants only. There is tentative
evidence that non-migrants move out of agriculture and into either manufacturing
or services when U.S. demand is high, but the estimates are not sufficiently precise
to draw strong conclusions. Columns (4) through (6) replace household fixed effects
with community fixed effects, thereby incorporating cross-cohort shifts in the occu-
pational distribution. Here the results are striking: a 10% increase in destination size
reduces the share of agricultural occupations by 2.5% among non-migrants. More-
over, the increase in non-tradeable occupations is more than twice as large as the
increase in tradeable occupations.20 I interpret this finding as support for the demand
pull over the credit push mechanism: higher U.S. remittances benefit non-migrants
by increasing the demand for non-tradeable services in the local community.
5.3 Business Ownership
In this section, I investigate the relationship between demand for migrants and busi-
ness ownership. Opening a business represents a capital investment in the local
economy; if the model presented in section 2 is correct, higher demand for migrants
should increase the profitability of new investments and lead both migrants and
non-migrants to make additional investments. Higher demand for migrants may also
stimulate investment by slackening credit constraints. The evidence presented in this
subsection will help to adjudicate between these two mechanisms.
In some cases, opening a business-particularly a small retail business-may be a
response to a lack of labor market opportunities rather than an opportunity. That is,
some workers may opt to join the informal sector when they cannot find good work
in the formal labor market. Table A6 suggests that this is not the explanation for
the typical business in the MMP sample. The estimates in this table are analogous
to the occupational wage premia in Table A4; they are estimates from a regression of
survey year earnings on either a dummy variable for any business ownership (column
20The baselin frequencies of these two occupational catagories are very similar.
1) or a set of 12 dummy variables indicating ownership of each category of business
(columns 2 through 13). On average, business owners have higher earnings than sim-
ilar individuals who do not own a business. For example, conditional on community,
age and education, the average business owner has 15.6% higher earnings than the
average non-owner. This conclusion generalizes to most types of business, with the
notable exceptions of street vending and agriculture. The most common business
type ("store") is associated with a modest premium of around 8%.
The premia in Table A6 reflect returns to capital as well as returns to labor. This
is not a necessarily a problem: my goal is to demonstrate that business ownership is
typically an economic good rather than an indicator for a lack of other opportunities,
not to estimate business owners' shadow wage rate. However, these premia would be
misleading if business owners had more debt or if non-business owners had greater
assets in another form (e.g., real estate). In that case, business owners might appear
to have higher earnings, but their consumption level would not be above average.
The MMP data on consumption are too crude to test this hypothesis with any
precision. The 2002 wave of the Mexican Family Life Survey, on the other hand, has
detailed information on consumption and current business ownership. I used this
data to construct a measure of annualized log non-food consumption and regressed
it on a dummy for business ownership, a quadratic in the household head's age, head
education fixed effects and state fixed effects. The estimates indicate a consumption
premium of 0.376 log points for business owners (not reported),21 even higher than
21The regression was estimated on a sample of 6494 households with a male head and non-missing
data for business ownership and demographics. The standard error, clustered at the community
level, is 0.336. The consumption measure was constructed by adding up expenditures reported
monthly (times 12), quarterly (times 4) and annually. Expenditures reported weekly-predominantly
food, but also tobacco and some forms of transportation-were not included because of their variabil-
ity. I assigned an expenditure of 0 to any catagory with missing data. Once the total expenditure
measure was constructed, I windsorized it at the 5th and 95th percentiles of the sample distribution.
the average earnings premium estimated in the MMP.22 In light of this evidence,
the earnings premia in Table A6 likely reflect a real difference in business owners'
purchasing power.
Table 8 displays the results from regressions of a business ownership dummy on
the migration demand index, conditional on community, age and year fixed effects.
Migrants are included in the sample. Columns 1 and 2 show that overall business
ownership rates increase substantially when demand for migrants goes up. A 10%
increase in demand is associated with a 0.72% increase in business ownership rates
for young men, with a similar but imprecise increase for older men. Interestingly,
only 5.1% of individuals with migrant experience in the MMP report that they used
US savings or remittances to finance a new business; these people cannot account
for anywhere near the number of new businesses suggested by the estimates in Table
8. If we take these survey statements at face value, then the relaxation of credit
constraints at the household level cannot be the main explanation for the expansion
of business activity, and we are left with demand-side explanations.23
Columns 3 through 10 break up changes in the total business ownership rate
into business openings and business closings. Relaxed credit constraints are likely
to operate primarily through additional openings, whereas demand side effects will
affect both margins. Columns 3 and 4 limit the sample to person-years where the
individual was not a businesses owner the year before; effects on business ownership
therefore represent the opening of new businesses. The sample in columns 5 and
22Aside from differences in sample design, there are two reasons why the MFLS estimates would
be higher: 1) the MFLS variable on business ownership excludes agricultural businesses, one of the
less profitable business types according to the MMP, and 2) I measure non-food consumption rather
than total consumption in the MFLS, and the demand for food is income inelastic.
23 It is also possible that respondants are interpreting the survey question very strictly, i.e., to
mean that U.S. dollars were directly used to purchase business capital, and not that U.S. funds gave
the household sufficient total liquidity to make an investment.
6 is the mirror image, person-years where the individual did own a business in the
prior year. Unfortunately, business ownership is strongly serially correlated, so the
estimates in columns 3 through 6 are too imprecise to be informative. Columns 7
to 10 condition on business ownership status 10 years earlier and are more helpful.
Young men who were not business owners one decade earlier are 0.9% more likely
to open a business in the interim for every 10% increase in destination size, and
young men who already owned a business are 3.2% less likely to close it. The strong
effect on business survival is most consistent with an increase in general business
profitability caused by higher demand for locally produced goods.
The estimates in columns 1 through 10 include migrant workers, so it remains
possible that there is no effect on business investment for non-migrants (or a negative
effect if they driven out of markets by the new ex-migrant businessmen). Even in
that case, the additional investment in capital should benefit non-migrant workers
by raising demand for their labor. As it turns out, however, the relationship between
migrant demand and business ownership does not weaken at all when I include only
individuals who are never observed to migrate during the sample period (columns 11
and 12). Again, this is consistent evidence for a generalized increase in demand and
against the household credit constraint story.
Table 9 weights each business type by its associated premium from column 3 of
Table A6 and regresses the estimated business premium against the migrant demand
index (where the premium is 0 for person-years with no business and the maximum
premium for person-years with multiple business types). The estimates are positive
but not statistically significant. However, two points are worth noting: 1) The
coefficient estimates are approximately equal to the product of the effects on business
ownership rates from Table 8 and the average business premium (.1446 log points)
from Table A6. In other words, there is little evidence that the new businesses
induced by U.S. demand are concentrated in the low-value sectors like street vending
or agriculture. Instead, the estimates from Table 9 are simply imprecise. 24 2) The
estimated effect on business premia are actually larger when the sample is restricted
to non-migrants. There is no evidence that non-migrants are crowded into the "bad"
kinds of business activity when migrant demand increases.
5.4 Employment
A priori, we expect the employment rates of potential migrants to rise in response to
an increase in demand. Table 10 explores this hypothesis by regressing a dummy for
employment on migrant demand; employment here includes both work in Mexico and
work in the United States. Surprisingly, perhaps, there is very little evidence of any
substantial net supply response among young men, the group that overwhelmingly
responds to migration incentives. The point estimate from column 1 suggests that
employment rates of these men increase by 0.02% when destination size increases by
10%. That is, better opportunities in the US labor market induce a substitution of
US work for work in Mexico, but no net increase in effort. Of course, the base level
of employment is very high for this group (96.1%), and the few who are not working
may face relatively rigid constraints.
Employment rates for other demographic groups do seem to increase in response
24A related concern would be that the new businesses are all very small and much less efficient
than the average. In unreported regression estimates (available upon request), I examine the effect
of migrant demand on the size distribution of firms. I find that there is some validity to this worry.
The number of businesses with 5-9 employees actually declines in response to migrant demand.
However, the growth is concentrated in firms with 2-4 workers, not in single-worker firms. This
pattern is puzzling; one natural hypothesis, that family firms are displacing firms hiring non-family
workers, is not borne out by the data.
to migrant demand. The evidence is strongest for young women (age 16-45), whose
employment rate increases by roughly 1% (on a base of 24.6%) when destination
size increases by 10%. The point estimates for older men and women are noisier but
similar in magnitude. The most natural interpretation of this result is that secondary
workers are responding to increased labor demand with higher participation rates. 25
5.5 Robustness
I test robustness in two primary ways: 1) by including community-specific trends,
and 2) by testing whether future changes in destination size are correlated with cur-
rent origin characteristics. Note that if changes in migrant demand are strongly
serially correlated (and they are) and have effects with long lags, then both of these
approaches are "overtests" of identification. The community-specific trends will cap-
ture a large part of the effect of smoothly-changing migrant demand, and current
levels of outcome variables will reflect past changes in destination size (which may
be correlated with future changes).
The results of these strong tests are somewhat mixed. Columns (1) and (2) of Ta-
ble 11 are very encouraging; they show that the estimated effects of migrant demand
on migration rates and business ownership rates are strikingly robust to the inclu-
sion of community-specific trends. Columns (3) and (4) give slightly more cause for
concern, since they suggest that the communities that experienced stronger demand
growth over 1977-87 may have had higher migration and business ownership rates
25 An alternative hypothesis is that secondary workers must enter the labor force in order to
sustain the household when labor demand for non-migrant prime-age men collapses. However, the
evidence from occupational shifts and business investment both suggest that labor demand for
prime-age men does not collapse.
at the beginning of that period. However, the estimates are very noisy and far from
statistically significant, and their signs are the opposite of what a straightforward
mean reversion story would predict.
6 Conclusion
The effects of U.S. demand for migrants on non-migrant workers in Mexico are the-
oretically ambiguous and empirically difficult to assess. This paper uses variation in
the growth of U.S. destinations combined with information on destination-specific
migration networks across Mexican communities to trace out the labor market and
capital accumulation effects of persistent migrant demand shocks. I find evidence
that both migrant workers and non-migrant workers are able to access better work
and business opportunities when demand for migrants in the United States is strong.
The most parsimonious explanation for these results is that additional remittance
income raises demand for locally-produced non-tradable goods, directly increasing
demand for labor and the profitability of new capital investments. Multiple pieces of
evidence indicate that the effects of higher U.S. demand are not operating through
slackened credit constraints among migrant households.
I view this paper as part of vast cost-benefit project analyzing international mi-
gration. The potential efficiency gains from freer labor mobility are enormous, and
the supply of willing migrants from developing to developed nations is, for the near
future, unlimited. But while we know that migrants who move to work in a richer
country experience an enormous gain in living standards,. there have always been con-
cerns about the effects of large-scale population transfers on other groups. Achieving
the efficiency gains of international labor mobility will be easier if institutions can
be designed to ensure that as many parties benefit as possible. An important first
step is to understand the channels through which those parties are affected. The
literature on the labor market effects of immigration in receiving countries is by
now becoming mature, if as yet unsettled; the corresponding literature on sending
countries is still in its infancy. This paper suggests that workers left in Mexican
communities experience broadened labor market opportunities when their neighbors
are lured to the United States by higher migrant demand. However, like the rest
of the literature, I have focused on traditional "economic" outcomes. Many of the
concerns surrounding migration occur at the junction of economics and sociology. In
particular, the role of migration in transmitting cultural norms and values-in both
directions-is often emphasized but still poorly understood. While there are serious
challenges in addressing such topics with rigorous empirical work, it is an important
domain for future research if we are to achieve a theory of the costs and benefits of
international labor mobility.
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and now we can rewrite the response of non-migrant wages in terms of the response
of K:
dln(wMM)
= dln(wMM) + [(A- ()(1 - ) +1A) d ln ( Mdlnw M )
= [1 + h(, A, ) - dlnwM + [A - p
dlnwM
d In L
d In wM
= [1 + h(, A, ) - A](1 + Mg) - [A - p - h(a, A, ()] ML-LM
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TABLE 1
Calibration Results: Maximum Values of p that Lead to Negative Effects on Non-migrant Wages
Baseline Model Extended Model: Vf = 0.5 Extended Model: f -= 0.25
2=2/3 A=1 = 2/3 =1 2=2/3 A =1
1 - =1 -9.56 -5.33 -4.56 -2.33 -3.39 -0.83
1-;
M = -4.56 -2.33 -3.39 -0.83 -0.81 -0.08
1 M =1 -6.92 -3.75 -3.17 -1.00 -1.17 -0.38
1- a
m = 0 -3.17 -1.00 -1.17 -0.38 -0.35 0.19
All entries are cutoff values of p from equation (7) (baseline model) or (7') (extended model). See text for parameter assumptions not listed in the table.
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics, Male Household Heads
Males 16-45 Males 46-75 Males 16-75
Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard
deviation deviation deviation
Age 30.8 8.2 56.3 7.6 39.0 14.3
Years education 6.82 4.59 3.41 3.76 5.73 4.62
In US .110 .313 .064 .245 .095 .294
New trip to US .064 .244 .028 .165 .052 .222
Business (in Mexico) .132 .339 .222 .415 .161 .367
Owns property .463 .499 .791 .406 .568 .495
Owns land .094 .292 .258 .438 .147 .354
Married .709 .454 .892 .311 .768 .422
Child born this year .167 .373 .024 .153 .121 .326
Children born so far 2.82 2.82 7.00 3.82 4.16 3.72
Employed .961 .193 .899 .302 .941 .235
Agricultural occupation (Mexico) .254 .435 .449 .497 .315 .465
Manufacturing occupation (Mexico) .350 .477 .230 .421 .312 .463
Service occupation (Mexico) .160 .367 .181 .385 .167 .373
Agricultural occupation (US) .398 .490 .487 .500 .417 .493
Manufacturing occupation (US) .398 .490 .334 .472 .385 .487
Service occupation (US) .164 .370 .146 .353 .160 .367
Migration-years in community pre-1977 110 128 126 144 115 133
Log migrant demand 13.2 .691 13.2 .683 13.2 .689
N 119,273 56,135 175,408
Statistics exclude female heads, individuals born in the US, and individuals surveyed in the US. Communities with fewer than 20 pre-1977 migration-years are
omitted from the sample as well.
TABLE 3
Rank Correlations between Historical and Recent Destination Choices
All individuals Old individuals pre-
1977, young post-1976
Los Angeles, CA
Chicago, IL
Merced, CA
San Diego, CA
Fresno, CA
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA
Sacramento, CA
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA
Ventura, CA
Orange County, CA
San Jose, CA
Houston, TX
San Francisco, CA
El Paso, TX
McAllen-Edinberg-Mission, TX
.6206*
.7406*
.5082*
.6196*
.4557*
.6160*
.5097*
.5559*
.5028*
.4739*
.5068*
.4900*
.4062*
.5590*
.2537*
.4751*
.6113*
.3841*
.5082*
.3254*
.4973*
.3756*
.4139*
.3327*
.2979*
.2345*
.5046*
.2626*
.4953*
.1949
Includes all person-years covering men age 16-75 who worked in one of the 38 US destinations listed in Table 3. Figures refer to the rank correlation between the
share of such person-years in the listed destination pre-1977 and from 1977 onward, across communities. The second column includes only individuals who were
over age 45 in the survey year for the pre-1977 calculation and only individuals age 45 and under in the survey year from the post-1976 calculation. Stars
indicate significance at the .05 level.
TABLE 4
Migration to the United States, 1977-2004
Non-migrant in t-1 Migrant in t-1 Non-migrant in t-10 Migrant in t-10
Males 16- Males 46- Males 16- Males 46- Males 16- Males 46- Males 26- Males 56- Males 26- Males 56-
45 75 45 75 45 75 45 75 45 75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Migrant .1277* -.0114 .0217 -.0001 .2027 -.0129 .0924* -.0122 .7255* -.6304
demand (.0478) (.0330) (.0141) (.0090) (.1251) (.1504) (.0330) (.0316) (.2586) (0.3749)
Age and year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
fixed effects?
Community Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
fixed effects?
Observations 119,273 56,132 106,529 52,443 12,744 3688 75,941 24,989 7371 1793
R2  .1198 .0666 .0326 .0105 .0860 .1188 .0787 .0226 .1504 .2836
Standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating residence in the United States in a given
person-year. Columns (3) and (4) condition the sample on non-residence in the U.S. in the prior year; columns (5) and (6) condition on residence in the U.S. in
the prior year; columns (7) and (8) condition on non-residence in the U.S. 10 years before the observation year; and columns (9) and (10) condition on residence
in the U.S. 10 years earlier. Stars indicate significance at the .05 level.
All persons
TABLE 5
Log Domestic Earnings Premium for Migrants
Males 16-75 Males 16-75 Males 16-75 Males 16-75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant premium -.0424* -.0440* .0027 .0036
(.0197) (.0179) (.0168) (.0168)
Occupation Fixed Effects N N N Y
Education Fixed Effects N N Y Y
Age Fixed Effects N Y Y Y
Community Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Observations 7828 7828 7828 7828
R2 .9518 .9541 .9615 .9646
Sample includes men age 16-75 who were employed in Mexico at the time of the
indicate significance at the .05 level.
survey. Standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Stars
TABLE 6
Effects of Migrant Demand on Mean Occupational Log Earnings
Males 16-45 Males 16-45 Males 16-45 Males 16-45 Males 16-45 Males 46-75 Females 16-45
All person- Non-migrants Non-migrants Non-migrants Non-migrants Non-migrants Non-migrants
years + Migrants HH fixed HH fixed HH fixed HH fixed
during years in effects effects effects effects
Mexico (No Agr.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Migrant demand .2369* .0716* .0670* .0059 -.0232 .0247 -.0576
(.0675) (.0167) (.0199) (.0191) (.0138) (.0189) (.0373)
Age and year fixed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
effects?
Community fixed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
effects?
Household fixed N N N Y Y Y Y
effects?
Includes person- Y N N N N N N
years in U.S.?
Includes migrants? Y N Y N N N N
Observations 113,143 68,730 100,335 68,730 54,757 27,657 20,100
R2  .0955 .1966 .2313 .8570 .8174 .9514 .9109
Standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Samples vary by column. Mean log earnings by occupation calculated separately for females.
Stars indicate significance at the .05 level.
TABLE 7
Effects of Migrant Demand on Occupational Frequencies
Agriculture Manufacturing and Services (inc. Agriculture Manufacturing Services (inc.
Transportation (no Construction) and Construction)
HH fixed Construction) Transportation (no
effects HH fixed effects Construction)
HH fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Migrant demand -.0970 .0418 .0552 -.2502* .0782 .1720*
(.0518) (.0339) (.0578) (.0444) (.0416) (.0537)
Age and year fixed effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Community fixed effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Household fixed effects? Y Y Y N N N
Includes person-years in U.S.? N N N N N N
Includes migrants? N N N N N N
Observations 68,729 68,729 68,729 68,729 68,729 68,729
R2 0.8617 0.8073 0.8226 .2837 .1000 .0914
Standard errors clustered at the community level
significance at the .05 level.
in parentheses. Sample includes men 16-75 during years when they were employed in Mexico. Stars indicate
TABLE 8
Business Ownership, 1977-2004
All persons Non-business owner Business owner in Non-business owner Business owner in Non-migrants
in t-1 t-1 in t-10 t-10
Males Males Males Males Males Males Males Males Males Males Males Males
16-45 46-75 16-45 46-75 16-45 46-75 26-45 56-75 26-45 56-75 16-45 46-75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Migrant 0.0722 0.0583 .0010 .0045 -.0029 -.0187 .0902* 0.1213 .3225* -0.1321 .0723 * .0450
demand (0.0322) (0.0767) (.0089) (.0122) (.0227) (.0253) (.0418) (0.0721) (.1264) (0.2808) (.0371) (.0564)
Age and year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
fixed effects?
Community Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
fixed effects?
Observations 119,273 56,135 104,907 44,143 14,366 11,992 77,629 22,179 5683 4616 73,005 31,387
R2  .0686 .0568 .0074 .0062 0.0207 .0179 .0303 .0360 .1101 .1535 .0738 .0703
Standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating ownership of some business. Columns (4)
through (6) condition on non-business ownership in the prior year; columns (7) through (9) condition on business ownership in the prior year. Stars indicate
significance at the .05 level.
TABLE 9
Effects of Migrant Demand on Mean Business Earnings Premium
Males 16-45 Males 16-45 Males 16-45 Males 16-45 Males 46-75
All person-years Non-migrants Non-migrants + Non-migrants Non-migrants
Migrants duringMigrants during HH fixed effects HH fixed effects
years in Mexico
HH fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migrant demand .0085 .0131 .0067 .0097 .0014
(.0060) (.0069) (.0071) (.0080) (.0083)
Age and year fixed Y Y Y Y Y
effects?
Community fixed Y Y Y Y Y
effects?
Household fixed N N Y Y Y
effects?
Includes person-years in Y N N N N
U.S.?
Includes migrants? Y N Y N N
Observations 119,273 73,021 119,273 73,021 31,404
R2  .0506 .0535 .7058 .7142 .8708
Standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Samples vary by column. Business earnings premia are from column (3) of Table 13.
TABLE 10
Employment, 1977-2004
Males Females
Males 16-45 Males 46-75 Females 16- Females 46-
45 75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant demand .0017 .0998 .1034* .1689
(.0267) (.0549) (.0479) (.0899)
Age and year fixed Y Y Y Y
effects?
Community fixed Y Y Y Y
effects?
Observations 119,273 56,135 86,267 25,472
R2 .0439 .0730 .0439 .0730
Standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Dependent variables is a dummy variable indicating employment (excluding students and
pensioners who work part-time). Stars indicate significance at the .05 level.
TABLE 11
Robustness: Community-specific Trends, 1977-2004
Correlation of 1977 Levels with 1977-87 Changes in Migrant Demand
Males 16-45
Community-specific trends Correlation of Levels with Future
Demand Shocks
Migration Business Migration Business
Ownership Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant demand .1014* .0951
(.0398) (.0571)
Change in migrant demand, 1977-87 .1784 .0656
(.1609) (.0644)
Age and year fixed effects? Y Y Y Y
Community fixed effects? Y Y N N
Community trends Y Y N N
Observations 119,273 119,273 6071 6071
R2  .1267 .0732 .0104 .0338
Columns (1) and (2) add a time trend interacted with each community fixed effect to the specifications of Table 4, column (1) and Table 8, column 1. Columns
(3) and (4) report on a cross-sectional regression where the primary explanatory variable is the change in migrant demand over 1977-87 and the dependent
variables are migration rates and business ownership rates in 1977. Standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at
the .05 level.
TABLE Al
Frequency of US Destinations in Migration, pre-1977
Destination Proportion of Destination Proportion of
migration-years (%) migration-years (%)
Los Angeles, CA 21.0 Phoenix-Mesa 1.0
Chicago, IL 8.2 Stockton-Lodi, CA 0.9
Merced, CA 6.6 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 0.7
San Diego, CA 6.2 Salinas, CA 0.7
Fresno, CA 5.4 Denver, CO 0.6
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 4.9 Philadelphia, PA-NJ 0.6
Sacramento, CA 4.9 Bakersfield, CA 0.5
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 4.8 Waco, TX 0.4
Ventura, CA 4.8 Kansas City, MO-KS 0.4
Orange County, CA 3.2 New York, NY 0.4
San Jose, CA 3.1 Corpus Christi, TX 0.3
Houston, TX 2.5 Pueblo, CO 0.3
San Francisco, CA 2.3 Fort Worth-Arlington 0.3
El Paso, TX 2.1 Las Vegas, NV-AZ 0.3
McAllen-Edinberg-Mission, TX 2.0 Abilene, TX 0.3
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 1.8 Visali-Tulare-Porterville, CA 0.3
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 1.8 Reno, NV 0.3
San Antonio, TX 1.6 Modesto, CA 0.3
Dallas, TX 1.4 San Angelo, TX 0.2
Universe includes all person-years that 1) are male, 2) occur prior to 1977, 3) have a known location of the primary job within the United States,
and 4) occur in a community with at least 20 person-years satisfying the above criteria.
TABLE A2
Correspondence between Metropolitan Destinations and "Core" Counties
Metro area
Abilene, TX
Bakersfield, CA
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX
Chicago, IL
Corpus Christi, TX
Dallas, TX
Denver, CO
El Paso, TX
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Fresno, CA
Houston, TX
Kansas City, MO-KS
Las Vegas, NV-AZ
Los Angeles, CA
McAllen-Edinberg-Mission, TX
Merced, CA
Modesto, CA
New York, NY
Orange County, CA
Core counties
Taylor, TX
Kern, CA
Cameron, TX
Cook, IL
Nueces, TX
Dallas, TX
Denver, CO
El Paso, TX
Tarrant, TX
Fresno, CA
Harris, TX
Jackson, MO;
Wyandotte, KS
Clark, NV
Los Angeles, CA
Hidalgo, TX
Merced, CA
Stanislaus, CA
New York, NY
Orange, CA
Metro area
Philadelphia, PA-NJ
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ
Pueblo, CO
Reno, NV
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA
Sacramento, CA
Salinas, CA
San Angelo, TX
San Antonio, TX
San Diego, CA
San Francisco, CA
San Jose, CA
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA
Stockton-Lodi, CA
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA
Ventura, CA
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA
Waco, TX
Core counties
Philadelphia, PA
Maricopa, AZ
Pueblo, CO
Washoe, NV
Riverside, CA;
San Bernardino, CA
Sacramento, CA
Monterey, CA
Tom Green, TX
Bexar, TX
San Diego, CA
San Francisco, CA
Santa Clara, CA
Santa Barbara, CA
Santa Cruz, CA
San Joaquin, CA
Napa, CA; Solano, CA
Ventura, CA
Tulare, CA
McLennan, TX
Domestic Occupational
TABLE A3
Distribution: Migrants and Non-migrants
Occupation % of Migrants % of Non- Occupation % of Migrants % of Non-
migrants migrants
Professional
Technical worker
Professor (higher education)
Other educator
Artist, performer, athlete
Administrator or director
Agriculture
Supervisor in manufacturing or
repair
Skilled worker (food, beverage,
tobacco)
Skilled worker (textile, leather)
Skilled worker (wood, paper,
printing)
Skilled worker (metal, machinery)
Skilled worker (construction)
0.84
0.45
1.73
0.74
0.79
0.89
34.67
0.84
0.89
1.39
0.74
3.52
3.47
2.62
1.34
3.70
1.96
0.85
1.80
25.19
1.10
0.97
2.30
0.65
4.20
3.06
Unskilled worker (mining)
Unskilled worker (construction)
Unskilled worker (other)
Transportation worker
Service and administrative
supervisor
Administrative and support
worker
Retail establishment merchant
Retail establishment worker
Sales agent
Other sales worker
Ambulatory worker
Personal service or domestic
worker
Security or police officer,
firefighter
1.17
1.49
7.40
6.03
0.78
1.24
1.44
8.82
4.95
0.25
2.48
2.67
1.68
5.40
0.89
1.14
4.80
1.29
4.61
3.26
2.47
3.65
1.48
1.04
3.35
1.96
Skilled worker (electrical,
electronic)
Skilled worker (other)
Heavy equipment operators
0.79
9.06
1.73
0.81
7.93
1.78
Other protection services worker
Other or unknown occupation
Sample includes men age 16-75 who were employed in Mexico at the time of the survey. Migrants are those with a labor history in the United States (sample size
2019); non-migrants are those without a U.S. labor history (sample size 6567).
0.05
0.35
0.29
0.75
TABLE A4
Estimated Occupational Log Wage Premium Relative to Agriculture
Occupation
Professional
Technical worker
Professor (higher education)
Other educator
Artist, performer, athlete
Administrator or director
Supervisor in manufacturing or repair
Skilled worker (food, beverage, tobacco)
Skilled worker (textile, leather)
Skilled worker (wood, paper, printing)
Skilled worker (metal, machinery)
Premium
.5982*
(.0542)
.5155*
(.0641)
.4735*
(.0623)
.5099*
(.0831)
.2534*
(.0591)
.6873*
(.0596)
.4481 *
(.0729)
.2786*
(.0706)
.2461*
(.0461)
.4340*
(.0741)
.4498*
(.0409)
Occupation
Unskilled worker (mining)
Unskilled worker (construction)
Unskilled worker (other)
Transportation worker
Service and administrative supervisor
Administrative and support worker
Retail establishment merchant
Retail establishment worker
Sales agent
Other sales worker
Ambulatory worker
Premium
.2216*
(.0804)
.2654*
(.0662)
.1814*
(.0261)
.4286*
(.0350)
.4165*
(.0779)
.3676*
(.0410)
.5216*
(.0549)
.1793*
(.0468)
.4108*
(.0446)
.3698*
(.0659)
.1911*
(.0749)
Skilled worker (construction)
Skilled worker (electrical, electronic)
Skilled worker (other)
Heavy equipment operators
.3721 *
(.0315)
.2782*
(.0711)
.3206*
(.0368)
.2042*
(.0804)
Personal service or domestic worker
Security or police officer, firefighter
Other protection services worker
Other or unknown occupation
Estimated from regressions of log annual income/earnings on occupation, education, age and community fixed effects in each community's survey year. Wages
winsorized at the 5th and 9 5 th percentiles within each community. Sample covers male household heads age 16-75 who were employed in Mexico at the time of
the survey. Standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at the .05 level.
.2286*
(.0449)
.1678*
(.0416)
.4255*
(.1042)
.0933
(.0685)
TABLE A5
Predictors of Business Ownership
Any Store Street Rest. or Work- Factory Middle- Pers. Prof. or Other Agric. Cattle Other
Bus. Vendor Bar shop man Service Tech. Service Raising
Service
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
% of 100.00 24.51 18.06 3.59 15.40 1.82 6.25 1.80 1.62 1.35 4.97 4.08 16.54
Businesses
Past or .0536* .0240* .0154* .0014 .0082 -.0001 .0029 .0004 -.0018 -.0005 .0003 .0014 .0061
current (.0102) (.0059) (.0062) (.0020) (.0056) (.0018) (.0030) (.0013) (.0012) (.0014) (.0033) (.0023) (.0047)
migrant
Current -.1430* -.0298* -.0326* -.0019 -.0409* -.0001 -.0092* -.0015 -.0015 -.0013 -.0042* -.0072 -.0199*
migrant (.0167) (.0082) (.0064) (.0033) (.0067) (.0023) (.0031) (.0014) (.0015) (.0018) (.0020) (.0037) (.0053)
Age .0158* .0036* .0011 .0015* .0039* .0006 .0018* .0006* .0005 .0004 -.0001 .0006 .0021*
(.0018) (.0010) (.0011) (.0004) (.0007) (.0002) (.0005) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0005) (.0005) (.0009)
Age2/100 -.0107 -.0015 -.0013 -.0013* -.0037* -.0005 -.0016* -.0005 -.0004 -.0003 .0007 -.0001 -.0011
(.0197) (.0011) (.0012) (.0005) (.0008) (.0002) (.0005) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0007) (.0006) (.0009)
Yrs. of .0326* .0100* .0007 .0023* .0115* .0008 .0039* .0008* -.0008 .0001 .0010 .0027* .0039*
education (.0032) (.0018) (.0016) (.0007) (.0014) (.0005) (.0010) (.0004) (.0006) (.0004) (.0008) (.0008) (.0014)
Yrs. of -.1224* -.0416* -.0123 -.0094* -.0605* -.0037 -.0116* -.0029 .0117* .0007 -.0054 -.0138* .0062
educ. 2/100 (.0183) (.0102) (.0077) (.0037) (.0082) (.0027) (.0057) (.0025) (.0046) (.0024) (.0043) (.0041) (.0092)
Community Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
FE?
Obs. 12,849 12,849 12,849 12,849 12,849 12,849 12,849 12,849 12,849 12,849 12,849 12,849 12,849
R2 .0889 .0311 .0270 .0150 .0603 .0109 .0255 .0195 .0266 .0219 .2037 .0421 .0670
Standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Sample includes
.05 level.
employed men age 16-75 in the survey year. Stars indicate significance at the
TABLE A6
Earnings Premia to Business Ownership
Business Type % of Businesses Premium Premium
(1) (2) (3)
Any 100.00 .1721" .1446*
Store
Street Vendor
Restaurant or Bar
Workshop
Factory
Middleman
Personal Service
Professional or Technical Service
Other Service
Agriculture
24.51
18.06
3.59
15.40
1.82
6.25
1.80
1.62
1.35
4.97
(0231)
.0873*
(.0342)
-.0281
(.0330)
.3427*
(.0731)
.1997*(.0352)
.3015*
(.0711)
.3966*
(.0602)
.2430
(.1314)
.5412*
(.0829)
.5480*
(.2037)
-.0094
(.0719)
(0209)
.0801*
(.0296)
.0061
(.0332)
.3275*
(.0818)
.1827*
(.0330)
.3172*
(.0635)
.2717*
(.0599)
.1996
(.1234)
.3021*
(.0781)
.4024*
(.1747)
.0519
(.0683)
Cattle Raising 4.08 .2114* .2022*
(.0906) (.0836)
Other 16.54 .2625* .1720*
(.0452) (.0428)
Community Fixed Effects Y Y
Age and Education Fixed Effects N Y
Standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Sample includes men age 16-75 who were employed in Mexico at the time of the survey. Sample
size is 8602. Stars indicate significance at the .05 level.
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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of growth in the manufacturing sector
on the migration rates of Mexico's population. Using an instrumental
variables strategy based on local industrial composition, I find that
manufacturing growth has a strong effect on net migration at the mu-
nicipio level, dominated by changes in outmigration to the United
States. The estimates imply that the slowdown in manufacturing
growth between the late 1990's and early 2000's induced an additional
4.5% of Mexico's young male population to leave for the U.S. I also
investigate the role of liquidity constraints in shaping the relationship
between migration and labor demand. When a substantial fraction
of the population is liquidity constrained, we should expect migration
responses to be muted or even reversed. However, I find no empirical
support for this hypothesis at the aggregate level.
1 Introduction
When NAFTA was passed in 1994, expectations on both sides of the border
were that the agreement would stimulate economic development in Mexico
and substantially reduce the flow of migrants to the United States. Since its
passage, however, outmigration rates from Mexico have increased substan-
tially. In part this can be explained Mexico's rocky growth path and the
fact that the Mexican liberalization program did not have uniformly positive
effects for workers, tending to reduce demand for unskilled labor (Ravenga,
1997; Hanson & Harrison, 1999; Feliciano, 2001). Another component, how-
ever, is the responsiveness of migration to economic development at home.
The classical economic analysis of migration views population movements
as a mechanism for equilibrating labor markets: labor flows from low wage
regions to high wage regions until wage rates are equalized up to differences
in local amenities, and labor flows faster the wider the wage gap. Early
work tended to focus on internal migration within the United States and
found relatively high levels of mobility (Greenwood & Hunt, 1984; Treyz et
al, 1993).
For several reasons, this model may be too simple to capture important
aspects of migration decisions in developing countries. Cole & Sanders (1985)
argue that only individuals with sufficient skills may be able to obtain the
higher' wages in migrant destinations. Stark (1991) argues that migration
of a portion of a household can serve as a risk diversification strategy or
as a means of accumulating sufficient capital to invest in a business. This
paper focuses instead on liquidity constraints and migration costs. There are
several pieces of suggestive evidence that liquidity constraints play a role in
international migration. First, migration to the United States would surely
be an immensely profitable investment for a large fraction of the world's poor;
those living on less than a dollar per day should be willing to pay almost
the entire difference between their lifetime U.S. wages and bare subsistence
in order to move to the U.S. While migration costs (both pecuniary and
psychological) can be substantial, especially for illegal migrants, it strains
credulity to suppose that benefits are less than costs for every individual who
decides to remain at home. Instead, it is much more plausible to describe
many of the poor as constrained from migrating rather than preferring not
to migrate.
Secondly, evidence from Mexico indicates that the poorest households
are typically not the most prone to migrate even though they likely have
the most to gain (if for no other reason than that the floor of the U.S. wage
distribution is well above their earnings at home, even in PPP terms). Within
a community, migration often begins with moderately affluent households
and trickles down the income distribution thereafter (Massey et al, 1994).
Chiquiar & Hanson (2005) find that migrants to the United States are drawn
disproportionately from those with slightly above average levels of education,
and the poorest region of Mexico (the South) has long had the lowest levels
of migration.1 Finally, we have direct reasons to believe that migration to
the United States requires a substantial upfront investment for Mexicans:
a large fraction of Mexican migrants hire a coyote to cross the border at a
cost ranging from hundreds to over a thousand dollars, with no guarantee of
success. With fees for false documents, Hanson & Woodruff (2003) estimate
the total cost of crossing the border at between $750 and $2000.
Liquidity constraints can temper or potentially reverse the response of
migration to economic incentives. Indeed, studies of migration within de-
veloping countries sometimes find a muted response to development in the
source community (Liang, Chen & Gu, 2002; Soto & Torche, 2004). The
existing literature on Mexican migration tends to find stronger evidence of a
migration response. Hanson & Spilimbergo (1999) use aggregate time series
data on wages and illegal migration apprehensions to estimate an elasticity of
migration attempts with respect to Mexican wages of -0.64 to -0.86.2 Mun-
shi (2003) matches data from the Mexican Migration Project to rainfall and
finds that adverse rainfall shocks in rural areas lead to greater migration to
'See also Orrenius & Zavodny (2005), who find that improved economic conditions
in either the U.S. or Mexico are associated with more negative selection of migrants.
Although the authors do not propose this interpretation, their findings are consistent with
a model of liquidity-constrained migration.
2See also Robertson (2000), who finds evidence of integration of the U.S. and Mexican
labor markets along the border.
the United States. Stocklov et al (2005) analyze the effects of PROGRESA
(a conditional cash transfer program) on U.S. and domestic outmigration
in a randomized experimental design, finding that the program reduced the
probability of migrating to the U.S. by more than half.
This paper combines data from Mexico's Population and Economic cen-
suses and employs an instrumental variables strategy based on local industrial
composition (Bartik, 1994; Bound & Holzer 2000) to estimate the response
of migration to growth in the manufacturing sector. I find that on average,
stronger growth in a municipio's 3 manufacturing sector leads to a substantial
decrease in U.S. outmigration and an increase in domestic inmigration. The
IV estimates suggest that the slowdown growth of the Mexican manufactur-
ing sector from the late 1990's to the early 2000's caused an additional 4.5%
of young men to leave the country. However, the pattern of estimates does
not support a straightforward interpretation in terms of credit constraints.
In particular, while it is true that the poorest municipios have much lower
rates of migration to the U.S., the estimated response of migration to local
labor demand shocks is if anything more strongly negative there. In the
conclusion, I discuss possible reasons for this result.
The empirical strategy adopted here has some advantages over the exist-
ing literature. First, manufacturing sector growth is a measure of persistent
changes in labor demand. Since higher earnings relax liquidity constraints
3Mexican municipios are analogous to U.S. counties.
eventually but not immediately, persistent changes in labor demand may
have different effects than transitory shocks to agricultural productivity. This
paper also abstracts from certain complications in the PROGRESA exper-
iment. In particular, PROGRESA's cash transfers were conditional on all
family members' attendance at health checkups; since the checkups had to
be obtained locally, this policy made it difficult to use the transfer income in
order to finance migration to the U.S. for one or more household members. 4
The remainder of the paper proceed as follows: Section 2 develops an
illustrative model of the relationship between labor demand and migration
in the presence of liquidity constraints. Section 3 describes the construction
of the migration and manufacturing growth variables in some detail and lays
out the paper's empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the empirical results,
and Section 5 concludes.
2 Labor Demand and Migration under Liq-
uidity Constraints
In this section, I develop a simple two-location, two-period model of migra-
tion and its response to labor demand when migration requires an upfront
investment. In this model, higher local wages have two effects on migration.
4 The strong migration response in Stocklov et al (2005) also stems largely from pre-
treatment differences between the treatment and control groups.
First, they have the classical effect of decreasing the return to investment in
migration, thereby reducing the number of individuals who prefer to migrate.
Secondly, however, higher local wages in the first period increase wealth at
the beginning of the second period, enabling some agents who were con-
strained from migrating to do so. The aggregate response of migration to
labor demand within a community depends on the relative proportions of in-
dividuals for whom each of these effects dominates. Where a larger fraction
of marginal migrants are driven by liquidity constraints, the aggregate effect
of labor demand shocks will be smaller or reversed.
2.1 An Illustrative Model
Suppose that agents reach adulthood with initial wealth of Wo. At the be-
ginning of the first period, agents must decide whether to work locally for
a wage WL or migrate elsewhere and receive a wage WM instead. Migrating
brings higher wages (WM > WL) but requires an upfront payment of 6. Af-
ter the migration decision is made and income is received, agents choose to
consume an amount C1. At the beginning of the second period, they again
decide between local and migratory work (with the same upfront payment
6 required to migrate even if the agent had migrated in the first period).
Finally, agents consume the remainder of their wealth and die with utility
U(C 1, C2 ) = log(C1) + log(C 2). For simplicity I assume that all agents face
the same wage offers but I allow Wo and 6 to vary in the population according
to distribution function F(Wo, 6). There are no capital markets.
In this model, agents can be categorized into five groups:
1. Agents whose migration costs are sufficiently high that they never wish
to migrate regardless of their wealth. This case occurs when 6 > WM -
WL, so that the "net" migrant wage is less than the local wage.
2. Agents whose migration costs make the net migrant wage higher than
the local wage and whose initial wealth is sufficiently high that liquidity
constraints are not "too" binding. Clearly migration in period 1 is
optimal if and only if 6 < WM - WL and 6 < Wo, so the relevant
decision is migration in period 2 in this case. An agent who migrates
in period 1 only will set C1 = C2 and obtain utility
2 log[ (Wo + WL + WM -6)] (1)
An agent who migrates in both periods receives lifetime wealth C1 +
C2 = Wo + 2(WM - 6) but is constrained to consume no more than
Wo+wM-26 at the end of period 1 (and at least WM at the end of period
2) in order to retain sufficient wealth to migrate again. Whenever
Wo > 26, this constraint does not bind and migration in period 2
dominates because it yields higher lifetime wealth. If Wo < 26, an
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agent who migrates in both periods obtains utility
log(Wo + WM - 26) + log(wM)
Some algebra shows that 2 is greater than 1 if and only if
Wo > WO(6, w) - 26- -WM L - 6[2 - wM - L - 6] (3)
In summary, an agent will migrate in both periods whenever both
6 < WM - WL and 3 hold.
3. Agents who are wealthy enough to migrate in the first period but who
choose not to migrate in the second period in order to smooth con-
sumption. From the discussion above, this occurs whenever
6<
6<
WM - WL
Wo < Wo(6, wL)
(4)
4. Agents who cannot afford to migrate in the first period but who are
willing to save in order to do so in the second period. When Wo <
6 < WM - WL, the agent cannot migrate in period 1 and the relevant
decision is whether to migrate in period 2. By working locally in both
periods, an agent receives utility
2 log( Wo + WL) (5)
An agent who migrates in period 2 only receives lifetime wealth C1 +
C2 = Wo + WL+ M -- 6 but is constrained to consume no more than
Wo + WL- 6 at the end of the first period (and at least WM in the second
period) in order to save enough for migration. This constraint fails to
bind when Wo > WM - WL + 6, in which case period 2 migration is
necessarily optimal; if the constraint does bind, then total utility from
migrating in the second period is
log(Wo + WL - 6) + log(wM)
Again, some algebra shows that migration in period 2 is optimal if
and only if
Wo > Wo(6, WL) max{0, 2[wM - - W WM - L - 6} (6)
In summary, an agent will choose to work locally in period 1 and mi-
grate in period 2 whenever
Wo(6, wL) < W < 6 < M - WL
5. Finally, agents who are so poor that they choose not to accumulate
the wealth necessary to migrate even though their net migration wage
is higher than the local wage. From the discussion above, this occurs
when
6<
Wo <
(8)WM - WL
Wo(6, WL)
2.2 Labor Demand Shocks
Consider the effects of a positive local labor demand shock (i.e., an increase in
WL) in the context of this model. The effects of the shock can be decomposed
into three components:
a. The local wage increases relative to the net migration wage, so that
some agents who would have preferred to migrate now prefer to remain
at home, i.e., the parameter space occupied by group (1) expands. This
is the classical effect of local wages on migration.
b. It can be shown that Wo(6, wL) is increasing in WL , so that some agents
who would have migrated in both periods will now "retire" to their
home community in the second period, i.e., the space occupied by group
(3) expands at the expense of the space occupied by group (2). While
this effect stems from liquidity constraints, it again implies that higher
local wages will decrease outmigration rates. Intuitively, individuals
who can only barely afford to migrate in the first period would need
to maintain a strongly upward-sloping consumption profile in order
to migrate in the second period also. If the gain in lifetime wealth
from migrating again is small, it is preferable to smooth consumption.
Higher local wages reduce the gain from migration.
c. Finally, it can be shown that WO(6, wL) is increasing in WL when
6> WM - WL but decreasing in wL otherwise. Intuitively, poor agents
who are choosing between no migration and migration in the second
period only are subject to two effects. First, they like all other agents
experience a net wage effect-higher local wages mean that the gain to
migration is smaller and thus they are less willing to constrict consump-
tion today in order to finance migration tomorrow. Secondly, however,
higher wages increase their earnings and directly relax second-period
liquidity constraints. The first effect dominates when the net gain to
migration is small: the marginal agent with wealth of exactly Wo(6, WL)
faces a relatively lax liquidity constraint in that case, so that the bene-
fit from further relaxing the constraint is small and the net wage effect
dominates. When the net gain to migration is large, however, the mar-
ginal agent faces a very restrictive liquidity constraint, the benefit from
relaxing it is large, and so the positive liquidity effect is dominant.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the model. Figure 1 shows the range of (W0, 6)
the applies to each of the five groups when WL = 1 and WM = 3, with
Wo(6, WL) represented by the dark red line and Wo(6, WL) represented by the
dark green line. Figure 2 depicts the effects of a change in local wages from
WL = 1 to WL = 1.3. Individuals with migration costs between 1.7 and 2 shift
into group 1 and no longer migrate irrespective of their wealth. Wo(6, WL)
shifts upward from the dark red line to the bright red line, while Wo(6, WL)
shifts upward at relatively high values of 6 and downward at lower values.
As Figure 2 makes clear, the effects of a labor demand shock on a com-
munity's aggregate migration rate depend on the distribution of Wo and 6
in the population. When migration costs and wealth levels are high, higher
local wages are likely to have the conventional effect of lowering outmigration
rates. As migration costs and wealth levels become low, however, the role of
higher wages in financing outmigration increases and we are more likely to
see a perverse relationship between local labor demand and migration. The
empirical section investigates this hypothesis.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Migration Variables
I construct five variables capturing migration over 1995-2000 at the municipio
level using a combination of aggregate (INEGI, 2008a) and individual (Min-
nesota Population Center, 2008) Mexican census data. As a first step, I use
aggregate data to tabulate the number of men age 15-34 in each municipio
in the November 1995 Population Count and the number of men aged 20-39
in the February 2000 Population Census.I focus on young men because they
are the demographic group most likely to migrate in Mexico. The popula-
tion change between the 1995 and 2000 censuses stems from a combination
of inmigration, outmigration, death, differences in the two surveys' time of
year, and differences in the census undercounts for this cohort.5
While I cannot correct for undercounts, I attempt to correct for deaths
and timing differences. I estimate deaths by using the Mexican mortality
registry to find all deaths among men age 15-34 in 1996, age 16-35 in 1997, age
17-36 in 1998 and age 18-37 in 1999, attributing each death to the individual's
municipio of usual residence. 6 I then multiply the sum of deaths in each
5Note that sampling variance is not, in principle, a source of difference, since I use
aggregate data based on a 100% sample.
6Implicitly, this means that I may slightly overcount deaths in locations that received
a net inflow between 1995 and 2000, since ideally I would like to attribute each death to
the individual's place of residence in 1995.
municipio by 4.25/4 to account for the fact that 4.25 (and not 4) years pass
between the two population surveys; the result Deaths; is my estimate of
mortality in municipio i.
The difference in the two surveys timing (November versus February)
might affect the undercount rate, but it has a far more mechanical effect as
well. Because the surveys are separated by 4.25 and not 5 years, the co-
hort aged 20-39 in 2000 does not match up perfectly with the 1995 cohort.
In particular, the 2000 cohort is on average "too old" by approximately 9
months. Since the age distribution of the Mexican population is strongly
pyramidal, this means that the 2000 census undercounts the relevant cohort
and that this undercount is particularly strong in locations where the popula-
tion growth rate was high over the 1960's through 1980's. In order to correct
for this possible source of bias, I construct an inflation factor for the 2000
population size in each municipio based on the municipio's age distribution
of the male population, Inflation Factori.7
My estimate of the net migration rate into municipio i over 1995-2000 is
then
NetMigi = (Inflation Factori) * Pop2000j - Pop19951 + Deaths
Pop1995(
7The inflation factor is calculated as the sum of the municipio's male population age
15-34 divided by the sum of the male population age 20-39 in the 2000 census, times(0.75/5).
Net migration can in turn be decomposed into four elements: domestic inmi-
gration, inmigration from abroad, domestic outmigration, and outmigration
abroad. The first three of these elements can be estimated directly, while I
infer the last.
The 2000 census 10.6% microdata sample contains information on each
individual's location in 1995, at the municipio level if inside Mexico and at
the national level otherwise. I use this data to estimate the number of men
age 20-39 who lived in a different location in 1995. I define the domestic
inmigration rate to be the estimated number of men who lived in a different
Mexican municipio in 1995 divided by the 1995 cohort size in that municipio,
Number in other municipio in 1995
InmigMXi = (10)Pop1995i
I define the US inmigration rate to be the number of men in the 2000 census
who reported living in the United States in 1995, divided by the 1995 cohort
size:
Number outside Mexicoi
InmigUSi = (11)Pop1995i
A small number of individuals migrate to Mexico from a foreign country
other than the United States. I treat these individuals as living in their 2000
municipio of residence in 1995; the results are changed little if these men are
treated as inmigrants from the U.S. instead.
I construct the domestic outmigration rate by again using the estimated
count of men who were living in a different Mexican municipio in 1995, this
time attributing each individual to their municipio of residence in 1995 and
not to their current location. That is, the estimated outmigration rate from
municipio i is
umig Number in municipio i in 1995jOutmig MXi = (12)Pop1995i
Finally, I use the fact that net migration must consist of domestic or
international inmigration and outmigration to construct a measure of outmi-
gration to the US as
Outmig_USi = Inmig_MXi + Inmig_USi - Outmig_MXi - NetMigi
(13)
Since US outmigration is the only variable to be estimated indirectly, it will
reflect any errors in the net migration rate stemming from, e.g., differences
in the 1995 and 2000 undercounts.
Summary statistics for the migration variables can be found in Table 1.
Because the construction of these variables-and particularly the decomposi-
tion of net migration into its four elements-involves estimation errors, there
are a small number of extreme outliers. I therefore winsorize all migration
variables at the 3rd and 97th percentiles; Table 1 summarizes the winsorized
variables. Two features are worth noting. First, overall levels of mobility
in Mexico are quite high, in keeping with findings in the existing literature.
Secondly, the estimated levels of US outmigration are particularly high, on
the order of 16% for the average municipio. In part this figure reflects the
reality that large numbers of young Mexican men travel to the United States,
and in part it reflects the fact that smaller municipios have higher outmigra-
tion rates (average US outmigration weighted by 1995 municipio population
is approximately 11%). Nevertheless, I cannot rule out the possibility that
the high estimated levels of US outmigration stem from undercounts in the
2000 population census. As long as this undercounting is random, of course,
it will not bias the estimates.
3.2 Industrial Growth
Ideally, I would like to measure changes in local labor market conditions by
changes in wage rates. Unfortunately, complete and reliable earnings data
are not available for 1995, so I measure labor demand by the number of man-
ufacturing jobs per capita instead. With the possible exception of the Federal
District, manufacturing has tended to lead economic development in Mexico.
Cross-sectional regressions of average log earnings on manufacturing inten-
sity support this conclusion: conditioning on state fixed effects, log municipio
population, education levels, age and community size, municipios with 1%
more manufacturing jobs per capita in 1999 had approximately 0.82% higher
wages in 2000 and approximately 4.7% higher wages in the subsample with
fewer than 0.02 manufacturing jobs per capita." Of course, these regressions
do not necessarily reflect causal relationships, but they support the view that
growth in the manufacturing sector is an indicator of economic development.
Because employment data are available only for a subsample in the popu-
lation censuses, I use the 1994 and 1999 Censos Economicos (INEGI, 2008b)
to construct a measure of manufacturing growth over the late 1990s. Table 1
lists summary statistics for total employment in manufacturing per capita in
1994 and 1999. Over this period, the average municipio outside the Federal
District increased from 0.017 to 0.023 manufacturing jobs per capita (from
0.035 to 0.045 when weighted by population). Because the 2000 municipio
population is endogenous to labor demand, however, I do not use the simple
change in manufacturing employment per capita as my measure. Instead,
I notionally hold population constant at its 1995 level, i.e., my measure of
8Individual wage microdata was regressed on education, age and community size dum-
mies, with deviations from the predicted values aggregated to the municipio level. Esti-
mates are from a regression of these average deviations on state fixed effects, log municipio
population and manufacturing jobs per capita, weighted by municipio population.
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labor demand growth is
ManJobsi1999 - ManJobsi1994 (14)ManGr = (14)
Pop1995i
again winsorized at the 3rd and 97th percentiles. 9 This growth was concen-
trated in the border states, which experienced an average increase of 0.018,
and was far slower in the South (average increase of 0.006). Nevertheless,
there is substantial variation within regions and states.
3.3 Instrumenting Industrial Growth
Although fixing the population base at its 1995 level removes one source of
mechanical endogeneity, ManGri is nevertheless likely to be correlated with
unobserved determinants of migration. Most obviously, positive shocks to the
local labor supply entering through net migration may lead to the formation
of more manufacturing jobs, so that the OLS relationship between net migra-
tion and manufacturing growth is biased to be too negative. However, biases
in the opposite direction are possible as well: As always, measurement error
may attenuate the OLS results. More subtly, positive labor supply shocks
'Instrumental variables estimation should in principle eliminate any bias from this
source of endogeneity. Nevertheless, I prefer to hold population constant in the denomina-
tor because it corresponds to a cleaner thought experiment, i.e., a more clearly exogenous
shock.
that do not enter through net migration (e.g., more women in the labor force)
will tend to depress local wages. This will encourage both more business for-
mation and less net migration. Finally, higher levels of outmigration might
increase remittance incomes and stimulate new business formation.
In order to address these endogeneity issues, I construct an instrument
for the growth of the manufacturing sector in the spirit of Bartik (1994) and
Bound & Holzer (2000). The 1999 economic census data contain information
on employment in each 4-digit industry at the municipio level, and I draw
data on each industry's growth rate over 1994-1999 from Mexico's Encuesta
Industrial Anual (INEGI, 2008c). Letting pij be the proportion of manufac-
turing jobs in industry j in municipio i and gij be growth in industry j at
the national level over 1994-1999 (excluding growth in municipio i), predicted
growth in manufacturing jobs per capita is
ManGrIVi = (E j pijgij))ManJobsi1994  (15)
Pop1995i
Summary statistics for the instrument, winsorized at the 3rd and 97th per-
centiles, are found in Table 1.
Employment in two industries, tortilla production and petroleum, is not
available in the Encuesta Industrial Anual. The petroleum industry affects
relatively few municipios but is important in those locations; I therefore use
data on employment growth in the petroleum sector from INEGI's Banco de
Informacion Economica. The tortilla industry is much more important but is
more evenly distributed across municipios, and I deal with the missing data
by omitting this industry from the calculations of pij.
A more serious concern is endogeneity of the instrument. It is possible
that communities which selected "winner" industries are fundamentally dif-
ferent in a way that also influences migration patterns (e.g., more innovative
and open to change). This issue afflicts all instruments based on industrial
composition. However, the instrument used here departs from the standard
construction in that it uses industrial composition at the end of the period
being studied (i.e., in 1999). Clearly it would be preferable to use industrial
composition in 1994 instead, but these data are not available at the munici-
pio level. New firms that opened over 1994-1999 likely tended to concentrate
in high-growth industries; because there is stickiness in the exit of existing
firms, municipios with faster manufacturing growth may mechanically end
up with a greater proportion of high-growth industries. This factor may
inflate the magnitude of the first stage relationship and introduce some of
the OLS bias into the IV estimates. Nevertheless, in this context a small
degree of correlation between the instrument and unobserved determinants
of migration is still likely to leave the IV estimates substantially better than
OLS. Using the notation from equation 16 in the subsection below, the bias
in OLS is
BiasoLs = Cov(ManGri, Ei)
Var(ManGri)
while the (asymptotic) bias in IV is
Cov(ManGr_IV, ei)
Var(ManGr_IV) •* -
where -y is the first stage coefficient between ManGri and ManGr_IVi.
Because there is a substantial amount of variation in the instrument and
estimates of 7 are reasonably large, instrument endogeneity is not magnified
here to the same degree as in some other applications.
3.4 Empirical Specification
I estimate the following regressions:
Migi = 3ManGri + XiF + c (16)
where Migi is net migration to municipio i or one of its four components,
ManGri is the change in manufacturing employment per capita, and Xi
that contains some combination of a constant, log 1995 population, the log
1994 manufacturing jobs per capita and state fixed effects, depending on the
specification. IV estimates instrument ManGri by ManGr_IVi.
Two features of this specification are worth noting. First, the linear
form imposes an assumption that proportional increases in the manufactur-
ing sector are more important where the manufacturing sector is relatively
important. This seems intuitive: in a municipio with five manufacturing jobs,
adding a sixth is unlikely to have a major impact. Secondly, this specification
relates changes in population levels to changes in manufacturing intensity, in
line with the conventional specification in the rest of the literature. This
specification derives from a view of migration of a mechanism equilibrat-
ing wage differentials across labor markets. Alternatively, one might relate
changes in migration rates (i.e., the second derivative of population) to manu-
facturing employment. This specification would arise naturally from models
where the (static) equilibrium level of migration is not zero, i.e., positive
migration rates can persist in the long run even if local and migrant wages
remain constant. This is the type of specification that arises naturally from
the model in section 2; nevertheless, I keep to the conventional specification
because of difficulties in estimating pre-existing migration rates and in order
to facilitate comparisons with the rest of the literature.
4 Results
4.1 First Stage Regressions
Table 2 displays the relationship between the instrument and manufacturing
growth across various specifications. Overall, the relationship is strong and
robust, with a 1% increase in growth predicted from industrial composition
associated with 0.49% to 0.72% higher growth in manufacturing jobs per
capita. The estimated relationship is somewhat weaker when state fixed
effects are included, possibly because shocks to labor demand spill over to
neighboring municipios.
4.2 OLS Estimates
Table 3 shows the OLS relationship between manufacturing growth and the
migration variables, focusing on the unweighted specification that controls for
population and 1994 manufacturing jobs but not state fixed effects. Overall
the estimated effects seem plausible and moderately large. A 1% increase in
manufacturing jobs per capita is estimated to increase net migration among
young men by approximately 1.27%. (For reference, Mexico as a whole, ex-
empting the Federal District, experienced a net migration rate of -8.5% and
an increase in manufacturing jobs per capita of 1.4%.) Nearly half of this
net migration effect stems from lower outmigration to the United States,
with domestic inmigration and outmigration each playing some role as well.
Inmigration from the U.S. is not significantly associated with higher manu-
facturing growth and in fact the point estimate is "wrong" signed.
The OLS estimates are almost unchanged by the inclusion of state fixed
effects and when the observations are weighted by population. For brevity,
only the net migration estimate is included in Table 3 (columns 6 and 7);
state fixed effects and weighting increase the estimated effect of a 1% increase
in manufacturing employment from 1.27% to 1.31% and 1.51% respectively.
4.3 IV Estimates
Table 4 displays IV analogues to the first five specifications in Table 3. The
estimated coefficients follow a similar pattern but are about 5.5 times larger
in magnitude. Thus a 1% increase in manufacturing employment per capita
is estimated to stem net outmigration by 6.88%, quite large in relation to
the average population flows. In fact, the cohort under study constitutes
slightly over a sixth of the municipio population on average, so that the
IV imply that one additional manufacturing job leads to approximately one
additional young man in the local population (either attracted from elsewhere
or deterred from leaving).
As with the OLS estimates, inmigration from the U.S. appears to be un-
responsive to local labor demand, but outmigration to the U.S. is decreased
by 3.23% for every 1% increase in manufacturing employment. This coeffi-
cient can be used to construct an informative counterfactual: Over the late
1990s, manufacturing employment grew by 1.4% of the population in Mexico
and 11.2% of young Mexican men left for the United States. Had manufac-
turing growth been stagnant instead, as was actually the case between 1999
and 2004, the outmigration rate would have been 15.7% instead. Thus the
estimates here suggest that slow economic development at home, in the form
of a stagnant manufacturing sector, contributes substantially to the flow of
Mexican men abroad.
The IV estimates are largely robust across alternative specifications. Ta-
ble 5 displays four alternative specifications for the net migration and US
outmigration rates. Omitting control variables, adding state fixed effects
and weighting by population do not substantially affect the point estimates
for net migration. The same is true for U.S. outmigration with the exception
of population weighting, which completely eliminates the estimated effect.
This turns out to be driven entirely by a handful of very large municipios.o°
0oAnother concern not addressed in Table 5 is that income levels are correlated with
both the instrument and migration rates. The poorest municipios have lower outmigration
rates and a preponderance of "loser" industries. Unreported regressions show that the IV
coefficient on manufacturing growth is robust to controls for municipio wage rates in 2000.
4.4 IV Estimates Across Subgroups
So far, the estimated effects of labor demand growth on migration corre-
spond to conventional expectations: higher labor demand increases inmigra-
tion and reduces outmigration. The model in Section 2, however, suggests
that there may be important heterogeneity in this effect across locations. Ta-
ble 6 presents suggestive cross-sectional evidence that the poorest municipios
have substantially lower U.S. outmigration rates. As a first step, I use 2000
census microdata to estimate average log wage rates in each municipio. 1
Wages vary substantially across municipios; wages in a municipio at the 75th
percentile of the distribution are approximately 55 log points higher than
wages at the 25th percentile. I use this measure to categorize municipios
into average log wage quintiles. As Table 6 demonstrates, U.S. outmigration
rates are about 5 percentage points less in the poorest fifth of municipios
as in municipios in the third and higher quintiles. This difference does not
merely reflect the fact that a high proportion of the poorest municipios are in
the South, where historic migration rates have been low, since the estimate
is reduced only marginally by the inclusion of state fixed effects.
Despite this suggestive evidence, IV estimates within wage quintile sub-
groups (Table 7) actually suggest that labor demand shocks have stronger
11I restrict the sample to employed men between the ages of 20 and 49. The wage rate
is calculated as monthly earnings divided by 4 times hours worked per week. In principle,
the estimated wages are endogenous to manufacturing employment growth, and it would
be preferable to use earnings data from 1995 (which are not available). In practice, there
is considerable persistance in wages across locations.
impacts in poorer locations. For ease of presentation, I group the 2nd and 3rd
quintiles and the 4th and 5th quintiles together. Whereas a 1% increase in
manufacturing jobs per capita is estimated to increase net migration by 5.1%
in the richest municipios, the estimate rises to 12.2% in the poorest; similarly,
the effect on U.S. outmigration rises from a statistically insignificant 1.2% to
8.9%.
5 Conclusion
This paper estimates the effect of manufacturing sector growth on migration
rates in Mexico, using an instrument based on local industrial composition
in the spirit of Bartik (1994). I find that positive labor demand shocks
have a substantial positive effect on net migration rates at the municipio
level and substantial negative effects on outmigration to the United States;
the decrease in manufacturing growth between the late 1990's and the early
2000's is estimated to have increased the proportion of young men migrating
to the U.S. by 4.5%. This effect is robust to several alternative specifications.
Overall, then Mexico's labor markets are quite integrated internally and with
the U.S. market, enhancing economic efficiency and spreading the benefits of
development more evenly over the population.
If some individuals are constrained from migrating by poverty, however,
they will miss out on these benefits-particularly if they are concentrated in
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specific locations. This paper looks at aggregate migration responses to labor
demand shocks across municipios and finds no support for this hypothesis:
the response is at least as large in the poorest quintile of municipios as in the
others. One explanation is that credit constraints were comparatively unim-
portant in Mexico by the late 1990's. While this explanation sits uneasily
with the evidence that poorer communities and poorer individuals within
communities are often less likely to migrate, it is possible that the relevant
deficit for the poor is not money but rather other inputs into migration (e.g.,
social networks). Alternatively, the labor demand shocks used in this pa-
per might be too short run to relieve liquidity constraints. In the model of
Section 2, higher local wages today finance outmigration for some workers
tomorrow, while they deter outmigration for the wealthier segments of the
population immediately. Since I achieve identification by comparing munici-
pios with a preponderance of 5-year winner industries to municipios with a
preponderance of 5-year loser industries, I am implicitly assuming that a 5
year period is sufficient to accumulate the necessary assets for migration. Fu-
ture work could investigate this possibility by examining longer run shocks.
Finally, municipios might be too aggregated a unit to observe the effects of
liquidity constraints. That is, even if the response to labor demand growth
is less outmigration when aggregated over an entire municipio, substantial
segments of the population or specific communities within a municipio may
nevertheless respond positively.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
weighted Deviation(unweighted) by 1995
population
1995 Cohort Size 6654 20,304 16 300,788
2000 Cohort Size 6067 19,229 15 269,983
Inflation Factor (for 2000 Population) .0349 .0130 -.0058 .1934
Death rate (1995-2000) .0096 .0088 .0076 0 .1159
Net Migration Rate -. 1437 -.0848 .1005 -.3482 .0701
Domestic Inmigration Rate .0540 .0825 .0426 0 .1958
US Inmigration Rate .0098 .0066 .0130 0 .0500
Domestic Outmigration Rate .0539 .0719 .0405 0 .1690
US Outmigration Rate .1593 .1074 .0993 0 .3819
1994 Manufacturing jobs per capita .0172 .0353 .0322 0 .5222
1999 Manufacturing jobs per capita .0231 .0452 .0420 .0001 .5659
Change in manufacturing jobs per .0067 .0129 .0147 -.0147 .0591
capita, 1994-1999*
Predicted change in manfacturing jobs, .0017 .0046 .0073 -.0022 .1054
1994-1999*
Average log wage rate (2000) 2.2239 2.5221 .3669 1.3987 2.8599
Based on all 2129 municipios outside the Federal District without missing data. See text for details of variable construction.
*Change (or predicted change) in manufacturing jobs divided by 1995 municipio population.
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TABLE 2
First Stage Regressions
Predicted manufacturing
growth
Log Population (1995)
Log Manufacturing Jobs
(1994)
State FE
Weighted?
Observations
R
2
Growth in
(1)
.7235*
(.1215)
No
No
2129
.1283
Manufacturing jobs per capita
(2) (3)
.6269* .5488*
(.1025) (.1151)
-.0016*
(.0004)
.0022*
(.0004)
Yes No
No
2129
.1918
No
2129
.1703
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance at the 5% level.
107
(4)
.4850*
(.0946)
-.0012*
(.0005)
.0020*
(.0004)
Yes
No
2129
.2254
(5)
.6943*
(.2136)
-.0043*
(.0014)
.0045*
(.0011)
No
By 1995
cohort size
2129
.4086
TABLE 3
OLS effects on migration
Net Domestic US Domestic US Net Net
migration inmigration inmigration outmigration outmigration migration migration
rate rate rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Manufacturing 1.2719* .4711* -.0152 -.2346* -.5722* 1.3131* 1.5092*
growth (.1813) (.1006) (.0303) (.0788) (.2156) (.1844) (.1787)
Log Population .0034 -.0029 -.0011 .0022 -.0086 .0085 .0045
(1995) (.0061) (.0019) (.0009) (.0021) (.0082) (.0065) (.0035)
Log .0092* .0072* .0000 .0028* -.0054 .0068 .0106*
Manufacturing (.0042) (.0011) (.0005) (.0008) (.0051) (.0035) (.0030)
Jobs (1994)
State FE No No No No No Yes No
Weighted? No No No No No No By 1995
cohort size
Observations 2129 2129 2129 2129 2129 2129 2129
R2  .1145 .1458 .0156 .0450 .0670 .2360 .3224
Estimated for a cohort of men age 15-34 in 1995. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance at the 5%
level.
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TABLE 4
IV effects on migration
Net Domestic US Domestic US
migration inmigration inmigration outmigration outmigration
rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Manufacturing growth 6.8772* 2.6609* -.2150 -.2356 -3.2329*
(1.0176) (.2820) (.1240) (.4208) (1.1327)
LogPopulation (1995) .0203* .0039 -.0023* .0025 -.0181"*
(.0068) (.0024) (.0010) (.0016) (.0087)
Log Manufacturing -.0109* -.0006 .0010 .0026 .0051
Jobs (1994) (.0052) (.0020) (.0007) (.0015) (.0067)
State FE No No No No No
Weighted? No No No No No
Observations 2129 2129 2129 2129 2129
R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 .00459 0.0000
Estimated for a cohort of men age 15-34 in 1995. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
level.
Stars indicate statistical significance at the 5%
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TABLE 5
IV estimates (robustness)
Net migration Net migration Net migration Net migration US US US US
rate rate rate rate outmigration outmigration outmigration outmigration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Manufacturing 6.0710* 6.1237* 6.8978* 4.9991" -3.1225* -2.9624* -3.0590* .2032
growth (.7136) (.8180) (1.1458) (1.2135) (.6691) (.6424) (1.2231) (.5855)
LogPopulation .0217* .0350* -.0211* -.0126
(1995) (.0071) (.0101) (.0069) (.0071)
Log -.0105 -.0179 .0052 -.0072
Manufacturing (.0052) (.0089) (.0060) (.0053)
Jobs (1994)
State FE No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Weighted? No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 2129 2129 2129 2129 2129 2129 2129 2129
R2 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0143 .0000 .1029 .1274 .2343
Estimated for a cohort of men age 15-34 in 1995. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical
level.
significance at the 5%
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TABLE 6
Cross-Sectional relationship between U.S. outmigration and average wages
U.S. Outmigration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First quintile -.0500* -.0671* -.0448* -.0632*
(.0082) (.0083) (.0096) (.0099)
Second quintile -.0176 -.0241* -.0063 -.0299*
(.0101) (.0096) (.0041) (.0090)
Fourth quintile -.0009 .0063 -.0032 -.0045
(.0075) (.0071) (.0053) (.0112)
Fifth quintile -.0170 .0061 -.0088 .0017
(.0092) (.0072) (.0062) (.0124)
Log Population (1995) -.0080 -.0114 -.0104*
(.0065) (.0065) (.0042)
Log Manufacturing Jobs -.0112* -.0069 -.0116
(1994) (.0041) (.0036) (.0030)
State FE No No Yes No
Weighted? No No No By 1995
cohort
size
Observations 2129 2129 2129 2129
R2 .0336 .1315 .2338 .2593
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance at the 5% level.
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TABLE 7
IV estimates by wage quintiles
Bottom quintile 2nd and 3 rd quintiles 4 th and 5th quintiles
Net Domestic US Net Domestic US Net Domestic US
migration outmigration outmigration migration outmigration outmigration migration outmigration outmigration
rate rate rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Manufacturing 12.2409* 2.7141" -8.9166* 10.1113* -.3315 -5.9110* 5.1134* -.5980 -1.2487
growth (4.0740) (1.0524) (2.9021) (2.3932) (1.0540) (1.7720) (.7495) (.3540) (.8196)
LogPopulation .0372 .0076 -.0350* .0219 .0042 -.0211 .0117 -.0010 -.0036
(1995) (.0186) (.0045) (.0151) (.0107) (.0033) (.0122) (.0092) (.0026) (.0067)
Log -.0225* .0019 .0128 -.0075 .0015 .0016 .0017 .0051* -.0132*
Manufacturing (.0096) (.0031) (.0087) (.0078) (.0021) (.0079) (.0062) (.0021) (.053)
Jobs (1994)
State FE No No No No No No No No No
Weighted? No No No No No No No No No
Observations 432 432 432 849 849 849 848 848 848
R2  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0177 .0000 .0000 .0520 .1916
Estimated for a cohort of men age 15-34 in 1995. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance at the 5%
level.
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Abstract
This paper extends the study of optimal relational contracts and ownership struc-
tures to a market setting where agents can search for new partners. In the context of a
general equilibrium model with random matching, we investigate the effects of market
structure on the level of surplus that can be sustained in relational contracts and the
optimal integration decision. We then extend the model in two directions. First, we
endogenize entry into the market and find that the mechanism analyzed here can give
rise to a novel source of multiple equilibia. Second, we expand the set of possible own-
ership structures to include ownership of inputs as well as ownership of output, with
input ownership serving to influence the costs of separation.
1 Introduction
The prevalence and importance of relational contracts (self-enforcing contracts not enforced
by the rule of the court but by the concerns of the parties for their future interests) have been
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emphasized both inside and outside the economics literature. Inside economics, relational
contracts have been discussed informally by Klein, Williamson, and others, and Macauley
(1963) and MacNeil (1978) are prominent examples of discussions of relational contracts
outside economics. Formal economic models of relational contracts, including Bull (1987),
Macleod and Malcomson (1989), and Levin (2003) have focused on the conditions under
which a relational contract is sustainable. To date, however, little study has focused the
role of the parties' options in the outside market in shaping the structure of the optimal
relational contract.
Market conditions often imply an asymmetry in parties' replaceability. An agent on
the short side of the market can not only extract a large share of the surplus; he will also
have an easier time starting a new relationship with a substitute partner should the current
relationship turn sour, and this in turn increases his temptation to renege within a relational
contract. Consider, for example, an entrepreneur who has specialized knowledge of the
technology to produce a new product but requires an venture capitalist to provide funds and
business expertise. Suppose the entrepreneur is the only person who knows how to produce
the product but that there are many venture capitalists able to provide the same service.
In this setting, the venture capitalist is much more replaceable than the entrepreneur: the
entrepreneur can easily find an alternate venture capitalist, but the venture capitalist will
not be able to find another entrepreneur to produce the same product.
This paper extends the property rights (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990)
and the relational (Baker, Gibbons & Murphy, 2002; 2006) theories of the firm to a market
setting where parties have the option to terminate "sour" relationships rather than play
a static Nash equilibrium forever. Section 2 models a relational contract between a single
upstream and a single downstream firm in the spirit of Baker, Gibbons & Murphy (2002)-
hereafter BGM (2002)-allowing for the possibility of replacement in a reduced form way.
Section 3 is the core of the paper and places the partnership in a large market characterized
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by a random matching technology. Replacement costs stem from the time required for the
parties to find new matches, and we relate aggregate replacement costs to market structure,
i.e., the ratio of participants on one side of the market to participants on the other. Under a
reasonable matching technology, balanced markets have higher total replacement costs for the
two members of a partnership, but these higher costs can help to sustain relational contracts
by discouraging deviations. We also show in Section 3 that market structure influences the
optimal boundaries of the firm.
Sections 4 and 5 explore two extensions to the basic model. In section 4, we endogenize
entry on one side of the market and show that multiple equilibria can easily occur. While
other search models can generate multiple equilibria in entry (Manning, 2003), we believe
that the mechanism discussed here is novel. When there are very few upstream firms in
the market, upstream firms are able to capture a large share of each relationship's surplus.
However, the magnitude of this surplus can be quite small, since the market is unbalanced
and replacement costs are low. This effect can mean that upstream firms benefit from entry
by their competitors, holding the number of downstream firms fixed. In effect, an economy
can be stuck in a low-entry trap where one side of the market suffers from the fact that it
can too easily exploit the other.
Section 5 expands the set of possible ownership structures by introducing an input that
can be held by either party independently of output ownership. The owner of the input has
the right to carry it forward into future relationships; it can therefore act as a "hostage"
and facilitate long-term cooperation (Williamson, 1983). Interestingly, we show in Section 5
that Williamson's insight-that hostages can help to sustain relationships-is not always true
in our setting. When ex post bargaining over assets following the relationship's dissolution
is efficient, input ownership does not affect the sum of reneging temptations or total surplus
in the relationship, so the sustainability of the relational contract is unaffected. The irre-
placeable party is willing to terminate the relationship, purchase the asset and resell it to
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a new partner, all with no loss of surplus. When ex post bargaining is inefficient, we show
that Williamson's insight is restored, and higher surplus can be obtained by assigning the
input to the more replaceable party. Contrary to the transactions cost theory of the firm
(Coase,1937; Williamson, 1975 and others), we emphasize the positive effects of haggling
costs in sustaining efficient production. Section 5 also investigates the interaction between
input and output ownership in a special parametric case.
Finally, Section 6 concludes with some brief comments on directions for future research.
2 Relational Contracts with Replacement
Our baseline model in this section closely follows BGM (2002) but allows parties to separate
and form new relationships after a deviation rather than reverting to static production. For
now we abstract from the process of forming these new relationships; section 3 examines this
process in detail in a general equilibrium setting.
2.1 Players and Production
There are two types of firms, upstream (US) firms and downstream (DS) firms. There is a
continuous measure M of US firms and measure N of DS firms. All firms are infinitely lived
and share the common interest rate r. Unmatched US and DS firms are randomly matched
pairwise according to a matching technology to be described below; matched players are
subject to both endogenous and exogenous separation.
Each period that an US firm stays matched with a DS firm, it takes a vector of actions
a= (al, a2, ..., an), the cost of which is c (a). The actions affect both the DS firm's use value
of the product, which is either QL or QH, and the alternative use value in an outside market,
which is either PL or PH. In particular, probability distributions of the use value to the DS
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firm and the alternative use value to the outside market are
QH with probability q (a)
QL with probability 1 - q (a)
PH with probability p (a)
PL with probability 1 - p (a).
with Q and P determined independently. Assume that QH > QL > PH > PL and that
c (0) = 0, q (0) = 0 and p (0) = 0.
Finally, we assume the instantaneous payoff of any unmatched US or DS firm is zero.
2.2 Information Structure and Timeline between Matched Firms
The US firm's actions a are unobservable. The use values Q and P are observable by both
parties but are not verifiable and cannot be contracted upon; however, the ownership of
output is contractible. Finally, we assume that matched US and DS firms do not observe
each other's histories in previous matches.
The timeline is as follows. In the period when an US firm and a DS firm are matched, the
DS firm offers a contract C = (o, s, b) 1, b = (bLL, bLH, bHL, bHH), which specifies the con-
tractible ownership of the output o E {US, DS} throughout the relationship, a contractible
per-period fixed wage s E R, if o = DS, a per-period net bonus bij from DS to US which
is contingent (but not contractible) on the value of the output to the DS firm Qi and the
value of the output to the outside market Pj. After the contract is accepted, in each period,
sequentially, s is paid, US chooses a, and P and Q are realized. If o = DS, then DS decides
unilaterally whether to pay the bonus when bij > 0 and US decides unilaterally whether to
pay its "penalty" when bij < 0. If o = US, then after the realization of Qi and Pj both firms
1Based on Levin (2003), we restrict attention to stationary relational contracts.
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simultaneously agree or disagree to sign a contract in which DS makes a net transfer of bij to
US and US transfers the output to DS. If either party rejects the contract, the parties engage
in symmetric Nash bargaining over the output with US's outside option being Pj, resulting
in a sale price of (Q + Pj). At the end of the period, the players each choose whether to
continue the relationship or dissolve it, and nature decides to dissolve the relationship ex-
ogenously with probability E. If either player or nature decides to dissolve the relationship,
then both players return to the matching market in the following period; otherwise US and
DS repeat the game following the same contract.
2.3 Strategies and Equilibrium Concept
To define the strategies and equilibrium concept, we first define the public histories for the
players. For the DS and US that have been engaged in T periods of relationship, the public
history is HT = C, d' s , ({P, Qt, btt, d DSt)}T= where d's E {0, 1} denotes US firm's
decision to accept or reject DS firm's contract offer, and (d2 s,t d2DS,t) E {O, 1} x O, 1} denote
US and DS firms' simultaneous decisions on whether to break up from the relationship in
period t. Let H = UHT.
T
Next, the strategies for US and DS are defined as follows. The strategy of DS specifies a
contract offer C E {US, DS} x R5 and a mapping which for every period T maps CU ds U
HT - 1 U {Pj, Qi} to a period T transfer payment bu s E R and CUds U H T -1 U{Pj, Qi} UbT
to a breakup decision d2DS,T E {0, 1}. The strategy of US is a mapping which for every period
T maps CUdbsUHT - 1 to an action a E Rn , CUdsUHT-1 U{Pj, Qi} to a transfer payment
bDS E R, and CUdusUHT -1U{Pj,Qi} U bT to dS,T {0, 1}. (We denote the set of period
T voluntary transfers (bUs, bD S ) by bT.)
Finally, a relational contract between US and DS consists of a complete plan for US
and a complete plan for DS. A relational contract between US and DS is self-enforcing if
it describes a perfect public equilibrium in the relationship-in other words, we restrict the
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strategies of US and DS to be independent of private histories. The equilibrium of the game
between the matched US and DS firms consists of a set of self-enforcing relational contracts
between US and DS.
In our equilibrium selection, we assume that every time newly matched firms form a new
relationship, they maximize the total surplus from the relationship and equally divide the
surplus according to symmetric Nash bargaining, with outside options being equal to the
utility each party could obtain by returning to the match market. Such equilibrium selection,
which implicitly imposes stationarity, is reasonable given our assumption that matched firms
do not observe each other's histories in previous matches.2
2.4 Analysis
A contract (o, s, b) may be supported with or without relational contract. When there is
no relational contract, we call the regime spot governance; otherwise, we call it relational
governance. Like BGM (2002), then, we have four combinations of output ownership and
governance regimes: (i) spot outsourcing, (ii) spot employment, (iii) relational outsourcing,
and (iv) relational employment. Our analysis focuses on the sustainability of relational
contracts, treating spot outsourcing and spot employment as two of the firms' outside options
in the relational contract. The final outside option is to break up from the relationship and
enter the matching market in the following period. As in BGM (2002), we assume that the
most efficient of these three outside options is chosen after a deviation.
Before deriving the set of sustainable relational contracts, we specify the details of spot
outsourcing and spot employment and derive the total surplus to the matched firms under
such production modes.
Spot outsourcing We adopt BGM's convention that when the US and DS firm engage
2 This assumption has the same spirit as the assumption in MacLeod & Malcomson (1998).
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in spot outsourcing, the US and DS firms negotiate on the price of the output according
to Nash bargaining with equal bargaining power. Therefore, the price of transaction is
(Qi + Pj) /2. Anticipating that, the upstream firm take action aSO to solve
QL + q (a) AQ PL +p (a) AP somax 2 -c(a) us.
a 2 2 
The downstream's total payoff is
so E [Qi- PjIa = a SO ]
UDS 
-- 2
The total surplus per period under spot outsourcing is therefore
SO us + U QL + q (aS ) AQ - c (aSO) .
Spot employment When matched firms engage in spot employment, the upstream firm
will set a = 0 anticipating the downstream firm's lack of incentive to pay. This means that
total surplus per period is
SSE = QL.
2.5 Relational Contracts
In this model, separation is costly because it takes time for the parties to find new matches.
We derive equilibrium replacement costs in section 3. For now, we denote the discounted
expected payoff of party k as Uk, if k is in a contract of type c (where c E {SO, SE, R}) and
Xk if k is unmatched; we define the cost to party k of separation from a relational contract
as Rk - UkR - XkR and the total replacement cost as R =- RDS + Rus. The discounted
value of the surplus generated by contract c is S c. In general, we use lower case letters to
denote per period payoffs and upper case letters to denote discounted values. Thus u' is k's
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expected payoff per period in a contract of type c and sc - UDS + uc S is the surplus per
period generated by this contract.
Proposition 1 formulates the problem solved by the optimal relational contract:
Proposition 1 The optimal relational contract solves the following problem:
max sR = QL + q (a) AQ - c (a)
o,s,b,a
subject to
min max{bi} - min{bi} ,max bij - (Q - P) - min bi - (Q - P) 1)
< min{ R, m {sSE, 1 - } (2)
r S
and
a = arg max S+bLL (1 - q (a)) (1 - p (a))+bHLq (a) (1 - p (a))+bLH (1 - q (a))p (a)+bHHpq-c (a).
a
Proof Consider a relational contract (o, s, b). Suppose that o = DS (i.e., we are in a
relational employment regime) and that separation is more efficient than static production
after a deviation. In that case, the downstream firm will honor every possible bonus payment
if and only if
max {bij} • RDS
while the upstream firm will honor every bonus payment if and only if
- min { bi} 5 Rus
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(4)
If the parties will revert to static production after a deviation instead, then the downstream
firm will honor every bonus if and only if
{ E
- max {bi} + > max DS ,
1+r 1+r'
and the upstream firm will do so if and only if
min {bij} + 1 +
1+r
SSE SO
_US rUS
>mx1+r'1+rJ
Combining 3,5,4 and 6, a relational employment contract is sustainable if and only if
SR - max (SSE, Sso}
max {bij} - min {bij < min{R, 1 + r
Since the loss in surplus when a contract of type c terminates exogenously is (sc/sR)R3, we
can rewrite this expression as
SR - max (sSE, sSO}
max {b•j} - min {b•j} min{R, - max
r
( )
1 R- )}
Suppose now that o = US (i.e., the parties are engaged in a relational outsourcing
3This expression arises from the assumption that the loss of surplus after exogenous separation stems
solely from time spent in search. Since search costs are not dependent on past contracts when the nature of
these contracts is private information, separation costs from contract c must be proportional to the surplus
per period it generates, sC.
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DSO
I+DS
1+rJ
(5)
(7)
contract). Because US owns the output, if either firm reneges on a bonus payment then
the two firms will Nash bargain of the current period's output and agree on a price of
(Pj + Qi) /2, giving DS and US the instantaneous payoffs of (Qi - Pj) /2 and (P3 + Qj) /2.
By the same logic as above, DS will honor the relational contract by paying the bonus
following all realizations of P and Q if and only if, for all (i, j),
U Qi PjUDS U DSQi - bi + - + max U r - RDS ,1+r 21+r 1+r
i.e.,
UDRS i Pj UUSE USO US
> max{bij + + max US+ U -Rus . (8)
1l+r- 2 1+r 1+r' +r
US will honor the relational contract by giving up the output for the bonus following all
realizations of P and Q if and only if, for all (i, j),
Us %+Qi JUE UO U? 5Sbi + > + max E  rS r Rus ,
1+r- 2 1+r' +rl +r
i.e.,
Pj + Q Us U s E  U °  U Rs
minf{b, - } + >max r , - Rus. (9)2 l+r 1+r 1+r 1+r
Combining (8) and (9), a relational outsourcing contract is sustainable if and only if
max bi- - (Qi - P -min bj- - (Qi - Pj) (10)
SR - max SSE, SS(11)
_< min{R, . (11)1+r
= minR, maxsSE1 -sS (12)
Next, conditional on a y admissible bonus structure b, setting o (b) minimizes the
Next, conditional on any admissible bonus structure b, setting o = 5 (b) minimizes the
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total reneging temptation, where
DS if max bij} - min (bi} < max {b - (Q - Pj)} - min bij - 4(Qi. - )5(b) =
US otherwise.
Therefore, the firms' incentives to pay bonuses in all realizations of P and Q will be satisfied
if and only if (1) is satisfied.
Finally, under the assumption that any firm designated to make a bonus payment after
P and Q are realized will adhere to the relational contract, the upstream firm will choose a
to solve
max s+bLL (1 - q (a)) (1 - p (a)) +bHLq (a) (1 - p (a))+bLH (1 - q (a)) p (a)+bHHpq - C (a).
a
Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 tells us that the optimal relational contract chooses a governance structure
to minimize the total reneging temptation. The total reneging temptation is bounded above
by the most efficient alternative for the parties-spot outsourcing or spot employment as in
BGM (2002) or separation and replacement with new partners.
3 General Equilibrium with Random Matching
In this section, we provide a micro-foundation for the replacement cost by introducing an
equilibrium matching framework with exogenous market participation on both sides. We
show that when replacement dominates static production after a deviation, the surplus from
relational contracts increases as the two sides of the market become more balanced (in the
sense that M/N approaches 1).
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3.1 A Two-Sided Matching Market
Suppose there are M upstream firms and N downstream firms in the economy. Suppose
in equilibrium there are K matched pairs. In each period, with probability E each of the
existing pair breaks apart. In each period, each of the unpaired firms match with each other
according to the matching function
m(M - K, N - K) = ./(M - K)(N- K),
where a specifies the the efficiency of matching. 4
We study the steady state of this economy, where the number of matched pairs is constant.
Denote as ADS the probability that an unmatched DS firm finds an US firm in the steady
state, and denote as Aus the probability that an unmatched US firm finds an DS firm. In
the steady state, the number of dissolved pair of firms must equal to the number of newly
formed firms:
KE = (N - K)ADS = (M - K)Aus = av(M - K)(N - K).
This implies that, in steady state, the number of matched pairs is given by
M + N- (M + N) 2 - 4MN(1 - p2 )K= 2(1 - p2)
where p = I/a. 5
To study how the ratio M/N affects relational contracts, the following lemma will be
useful. Lemma 1 states that the sum of matching probabilities is U-Shaped with respect to
4We choose this matching function for simplicity and symmetry. The main results are robust to more
general matching functions.
5It can be shown that K = M+N+/(M+N)2-4MN(1-p2)2(1-p2)  > min{M,N} and cannot be a solution. This
expression holds for both p > 1 and p < 1.
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M/N, with a minimum when the ratio is equal to 1
Lemma 1: Let A = Aus + ADS. Then we have
dA
d(M/N)
dA
d(M/N)
< 0
> 0
if M <N
if M > N
Proof. First, we can show that
A = Aus + ADS = M-K+ - KVN-K
Now supposing that N > M, it is easy to see that
dK> 0.d(N-K
To prove the Lemma, it then suffices to show that
d( )- d( ) > 0.M-K M
Some algebra shows that
N-K
= 1+M - K 2(1 - p2) - 1 - - +
and it can be checked that N-K is increasing in whenN > 1.
The proof when N < M is analogous. Q.E.D. m
It is worth noting that in the special case of a = e, the expressions for the matching
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(N - 1)2(1 
- p2)
N-K
o(M-K
v/(N- 1)2 + 4p2 N
probabilities can be written in a particularly simple form:
Aus = E ; (13)
ADS - E
These expressions will be used in Section 3.2.
3.2 Replacement Cost
In this subsection, we derive an expression for the equilibrium replacement cost R, and we
show that the replacement cost is larger when the two sides of the market is more balanced,
i.e., the ratio of the number of upstream firms to downstream firms is closer to 1.
As before, let Xk be the total discounted expected payoff of party k E {US, DS} if
unmatched and Uk be the expected discounted payoff of party k E {US, DS} if matched.
We can write the total replacement cost as
R = I E (Uk- Xk)
k=US,DS
We assume that if party k is unmatched at the beginning of a period, then with probability
1 - Ak the party fails to find a match and receives its outside option Uk = 0. With probability
Ak, the party finds a match and can start production. When a match is formed, we assume
that the two parties divide the surplus through Nash Bargaining with equal bargaining
power. At the end of the period, each of the matched pairs dissolves with probability E.
Lemma 2 computes the link between surplus, replacement cost, and total discounted
expected payoff of matched and unmatched firms.
Lemma 2: For k E {US, DS}, the replacement cost and the expected total payoffs for
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unmatched and matched firms satisfy
R = (2 - Aus - ADS)(1 +r) R.
2(r + e) + (1 - E)(Aus + ADS)
+.L .
\ T rj T /"k 8 R
r 2(r + E) + (1 - e)(Aus + ADS)
(1 + r)Ak
r 2(r + e) + (1 - e)(Aus + ADS)
R.S 7
where sR is the surplus per period within the optimal relational contract.
Proof. Since an unmatched party finds a match with probability Ak, we have
Xk = AkUk + (1 - Ak)(Uk + 1
l+rx)
This implies that
l+r
Xk r[AkUk + (1- Ak)Uk]
r + Ak
Uk - Xk
1- Ak
- Ak [rUk- (1 + r)Tk].
r+ Ak
Therefore, the replacement cost R satisfies
(1 + r)R= [ l [UkT - (1 + T)g]
k=US,DS
Now letting Uk = 0, we have
1 - Aus rR= UUs
r + Aus 1 + r
1- ADS r
+ UDS
r + ADS 1 + r
Note that party k's outside option (when Uk = 0) during the Nash bargaining that follows
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t1 ( N
Uk
Xk
(1 +r)
(14)
(15)
immediately upon a new match is
1 AkXk Uk
1+r r+Ak
This implies that the net Nash bargaining surplus is equal to
Uk- Ak UkZ r + Ak
k=US,DS
Nash Bargaining with equal bargaining power then implies that
UDS
UUS
1 1 r
- XDS + VUkl+r 2 r+ Akk=US,DS
1
-= XU1+r
Substituting for 1 Xk = k, we have
r
UDS
r + ADs
r
r + As
r + Aus
r
r + AkUkk=US,DSZ r U
r + Akk=US,DS
and this implies that
UDS
Uus
r + ADS
r + Avs
Since each matched pair dissolves in equilibrium with probability e, we can write
Uus + UDS
1
sR + 1  [(1 -e)(Us + UDS) + e(Xus + XDS)I
1
= sR + 1 [(Us + UDS) - E(UUS + UDs - (Xus + XDS))I1+r
UDs) - ER].
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k=US,DS
r
r Uk
r + Ak
1
2
Sr Uk-r + Akk=US,DS
(16)
1
= R + [1(UUs +l+r
where R is the loss from replacement.
The above equation, together with eq (15) and eq (16), allow us to solve for Uus, Xus,
and R as a function of sR; we can then obtain the expected total discounted payoffs of DS
firms by using
r + ADSUDS UUs;
r + Aus
XD (1 + r)ADSU
r + Aus
Equation 14 follows from straightforward algebra on the above. Q.E.D. *
Lemma 2 establish the link between the replacement cost and the surplus in a relational
contract. The replacement cost is proportional to the surplus, where the factor of propor-
tionality
(2 - Aus - ADS)(1 + r)
2(r + e) + (1 - e)(Aus + ADS)
is decreasing in the sum of the matching probabilities. Noting that by Lemma 1, the sum of
the matching probabilities is smaller when the ratio of US firms to DS firms is closer to 1,
this implies that the replacement cost is larger when the market is more balanced (holding
the sR fixed).
Since Proposition 1 relates sR to R, we deduce the relationship between market balance
and the surplus supportable in relational contracts.
Proposition 2: Suppose that replacement is more efficient than static production after
a deviation from the relational contract, i.e.,
sR - max sSE sSO ( 1 -R)R < 1-
T~SR
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Then
dsR
> 0 ifM <Nd(M/N)
dsR < 0 if M > N'
d(M/N) -
When static production is more efficient than replacement, on the other hand,
dsR
< 0 ifM<N
d(M/N) -
dsR
> 0 if M>N
d(M/iN) -
Proof. By Lemma 2, we can write the replacement cost as
(2 - A)(1 + r) RR= s2(r + E) + (1 - E)A
where A = Aus + ADS is the sum of matching probabilities. It is clear that (2-A)(~+ +)A2(r+e)+(2-l)A
decreases with A. So by Lemma 1, (2-)(1+r) increases when i becomes closer to 1.
Now consider a relational employment contract with bonus payments {bij}. By Proposi-
tion 1, a necessary and sufficient condition for this contract to be self-enforcing is that
max {bij} - min {bj} 5 min{R, R max - }
r SR
As M approaches 1, the left hand side of the above inequality does not change. If replacement
dominates static production, then the right hand side increases, so that the same relational
contract continues to be sustainable. It follows that total surplus from the relational contract
sR must weakly increase. On the other hand, if static production dominates replacement
then the right hand side of this inequality is decreasing as m approaches 1, and sR must
131
weakly decrease.
A similar argument can be applied to relational outsourcing contracts.
Q.E.D. m
Proposition 2 shows that market balance can affect the sustainability of relational con-
tracts through total replacement costs. When static production dominates replacement, a
deviation does not trigger replacement costs; however, high replacement costs effectively
increase the discount rate by magnifying the effects of exogenous separation and therefore
make relational contracts harder to sustain. In this case, relational surplus is highest when
the market is unbalanced. When replacement dominates static production, on the other
hand, high replacement costs act directly as a deterrent against deviations. In this case,
highly unbalanced markets can prevent effective relational contracts from operating. This
logic is most easily grasped when considering an extreme case of market unbalance. Suppose
that there is one upstream firm and infinitely many downstream firms. In this case, the
upstream firm is totally irreplaceable and can easily find a new downstream firm when the
existing relational contract breaks up. Neither party has much to fear from breakup: the
upstream firm can immediately find a new partner, and the downstream firm is receiving
negligible rents (because it has no bargaining power). When breakup is not costly, only
static production will be sustainable.
For the remainder of this paper, we focus on the scenario where replacement dominates
static production. This case holds when static production is very inefficient or replacement
costs are not too high, and it corresponds to the presumption that sour relationships will
typically dissolve.
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3.3 Market Structure and Optimal Ownership Structures
In this subsection, we examine the relationship between market structure (M/N) and the
relative surplus generated by relational employment and outsourcing contracts. We impose
the following parametric forms:
q(a) = j qiai
i=1 piai
p(a) = n piai
c(a) =1
Following BGM (2002), we also restrict the structure of bonus payments to be
bij = bi + /3
and define Ab = bH - bL and AA = •H - /L. In this case, the upstream party's first best
actions are
a B = qiAQ
while the actions actually chosen will be
aR = qiAb + piAf
Under these parametric forms, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that replacement dominates static production after a devia-
tion. Then higher replacement costs make employment attractive relative to outsourcing.
Formally, if R 1 < R 2 , then it will never be optimal to use employment when R = R 1 and
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outsourcing when R = R 2.
Proof. When replacement is the efficient choice after a deviation, then (by the envelope
theorem) the derivative of per period surplus with respect to R is
SR REsREi'(R) = RE
sROI (R) = ,RO
where rj' is the Lagrange multiplier from the optimization of sm. Since the optimization of
5R with respect to Ab implies
-= n (AQqi - qjai)
sRE(R) _- SRO(R) is increasing in R whenever
n q(aRE - a0o) < 0
Because aRE - aRO < 0 for all i, the above inequality is clearly true.
Corollary 1 When the market is more balanced (M/N is closer to 1), we are more likely
to see employment contracts.
Proof. This follows directly from the fact that replacement costs are higher in more balanced
markets. n
The intuition for Proposition 3 stems from the fact that overall effort levels are higher
when the upstream firm owns output-outsourcing contracts have high incentives relative to
employment contracts, which induce both productive efforts to raise q and unproductive
7 See Result 2 in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002).
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efforts to raise p. Higher replacement costs allow relational contracts to have stronger incen-
tives irrespective of output ownership, but the relaxation of this constraint is more valuable
when the base levels of effort are low due to convex effort costs.
4 Endogenous Entry and Multiple Equilibria
In the previous section, the numbers of US and DS firms were fixed. In this section, we
endogenize M and N and show that multiple equilibria can arise.
In a two-sided market, it is common to obtain multiple equilibria through interactive
positive feedback between the two sides of the market: workers are willing to enter only
when there are sufficiently many jobs being offered, and firms are willing to enter only when
enough workers are looking for jobs. (See for example Manning (2003) for a discussion of
models with this logic.)
Multiple equilibria arise in our model for reasons independent of such positive feedback.
To distinguish this model from other multiple equilibrium models with positive feedback, we
assume that the number of DS firms is fixed (corresponding to an entry cost of 0 for the
first N firms and infinite entry costs for all others). Multiple equilibria arise because the
surplus from relational contracts depends the balance between the two sides of the market.
When very few US firms are in the market, the market is unbalanced, surplus from relational
contracts is low, and other US firms may not want to enter. When more US firms enter,
the market becomes more balanced, the surplus from relational contracts increases, and this
makes it more attractive for further US firms to enter. In other words, there are increasing
return to entry when there are few US firms relative DS firms. Since individual US firms do
not take this positive externality into account, the economy can be stuck in an equilibrium
with few US firms or no US firms at all.
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On the other hand, once sufficiently many US firms have entered, there can be over entry
in this economy. The reason is that when there are more US firms than DS firms, new
entries of US firms make the market more unbalanced, and this decreases the surplus from
relational contracts. Since individual US firms do not take into account this negative entry
externality, there can be excessive entries of US firms as well.
4.1 Setup
To formalize these ideas, we consider the following example. Suppose the entry cost of DS
firms is 0, and there are a total of N DS firms in the economy. Suppose the entry cost of US
firms is 0 for the first e2N firms, and it is c > 0 for the rest of the US firms. The maximum
number of US firm is bounded by .8
Now assume that the production function is given by
q(a) = qa;
p(a) = 0;
1
c(a) = a22
For simplicity, we assume that the US and DS parties will engage in relational outsourcing
contracts 9, and in case of a deviation, the relationship will be dissolved and the parties will
look for new matches in the market (i.e., replacement dominates static production).
To further simplify the expressions, we assume that a = e. If in equilibrium M US firms
enter the market, by Lemma 1 we have
AUS - A DS =E
8These assumptions are made for technical reasons. Essentially, they gurantee that in the steady state
we have Aus and ADS bounded by 1.
'When p(a) = 0, BGM (2002) show that the relational oursourcing dominates relational employment.
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Recalling that A = Aus + ADS is the sum of matching probabilities, we can write
A + VA2 -4e 2
2
A - /A2 - 4e 2
2
for M < N
for M > N
Note that the assumptions on the entry cost of US firms guarantees that Aus and ADS
are between 0 and 1. It follows that the range of A is between 2e and 1 + e2.
4.2 Analysis
Before we study the entry decision of US firms, we first derive expressions for the surplus of
unmatched firms as a function of the sum of matching probabilities.
By Levin (03), we can restrict our analysis of relational contracts to stationary ones.
Since p(a) = 0, we may assume that the relational contract specifies a bonus b if Q = QH.
In this case, the DS firm's maximization problem per period is reduced to
1
max bqa - -a 2
a 2
Therefore, we have
a(b)
sR(b)
=qb
= q2b - q2b22
where a(b) is the agent's action and sR(b) is the total surplus in the relationship per period.
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Aus
Note that the first best is given by
bFB 1
FB
a
SR(FB)
For this to be sustainable, Proposition 1 implies that we need
1 1
lbFB = _ < R.
2 2-
From Lemma 2, we know that R = (2-A)(1+r) sR. It follows that the first best is attainable
when
2 2(r + E) + (1 - E)Aq2 > (2 - A)(1 + r)
In this case, we know from Lemma 2 that the expected payoff of entering the market for a
US firm is
Xus
q2(1 + r) 2 (A + A2 -4 2)
4r 2(r + E) + (1 - E)A
q2(1 + r) 2 (A- IA 2 - 4E2)
4r 2(r + E) + (1 - )A
if M< N
if M > N.
(17)
When the first best cannot be achieved, the optimal relational contact must satisfy
b
-= R,
2
because otherwise the parties can increase b and achieve a higher level of effort and thus a
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= q
1 2
= q.2
higher payoff. Using the DS firm's effort response, we have
sR = 2q 2(R - R 2).
Note that by Lemma 2, we also have
SR 2( + e) + (1 - )AR.(2 - A)(1 + r)
These two equations imply that
2q 2 _ 2(r+e)+(1-E)AR (2-A)(1+r)
2q2
Now using Lemma 2, we see that when first best level of effort cannot be sustained, we have
S(1 + r)AUsR
(2 - A)r
1 A + A2 - 4 2 (2(1 + r)q 2(r + ) + (1 - e)A
= 2rq2  2((2(1 + r)q - 2- ) ifM<N (18)2rq2 2(2 - A) 2 - A
1 A - A - 4 2 (2(1 + r)q 2(r + e) + (1 - e)A
2rq2  2(2 - A) 2 - A
It is also clear from the expression above that when q2 < 2(re)+( -)A no relational
contracts can be sustained. Together with the condition that first best can we achieved
when q2 > 2(-+E)(1-)eA we have the following result.
Proposition 4: The sustainable surplus in the relational outsourcing contract satisfies
the following:
(i): If q2 > 2(r+e)+(1-E)(1+e 2 ) first best actions can be sustained in the relational contract
regardless of the number of firms in the economy.
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(ii): If 2 (r+E)+(1-)(1+E2 ) < 2 < 2(r+e)+(1-)(1+E2) then there exists a A* such that first
best actions can be sustained in the relational contract for A < A*. When A > A*, relational
contracts are possible but only second best level of effort can be sustained.
(iii): If (r+)+(1-E) < q2 < 2(r+E)+(1-e)(1+e2) 10 then there exists a A* < A* such thati(1-E)(1+) < < 2(1-E 2)(1+r)
first best actions can be sustained in the relational contract for A < A*. When A* < A < A),
relational contracts are possible but only second best level of effort can be sustained. When
A > A~, no relational contract is possible.
(iv): If ( )+(1E) < q (r+e)+(1E)E, then there exists a A* such that when A <
2(1-E)(1+r) (1-E)(1+r)
A, relational contracts are possible but only second best level of effort can be sustained. When
A > Ag, no relational contract is possible.
(v): If q2 < 2(-)(1-e))e no relational contract is possible.
Proof. Straightforward calculations. *
Proposition 4 enables us to calculate the equilibrium number of US firms that enter.
Some cases are straightforward. First, when q2  (2(r+)+(1)(+2)) Proposition 3 implies
that first best actions will always be achieved. It is easy to see that the expected payoff of
entering US firms, Xus, is strictly decreasing in M. Therefore, there will be a unique level
of M at which Xus(M) = c.
Second, when q2 < (r+E)+(l-E ) which implies that q2 < 2(r+E)+(1-e)A for all feasible levels(1-E)(1±r) 2(2-A)(1+r)
of A, no relational contract can be sustained and there will be no entry of US firms other
than the EN ones that have entry costs of 0.
Cases (ii), (iii), and (iv) are more interesting. Since the analysis for the three cases are
similar in spirit, we provide below only the analysis of (iii), which gives the richest set of
possibilities for the outcomes from relational contract.
10Assuming that 2er < 1 - E -2  3 . Otherwise, this set is empty.
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Proposition 5: Suppose (r+e)+(1-)e <2 < (2(r+e)+(1-E)(1+e 2)) Then there exists a c*
such that if the entry cost c > c*, no US firms enter other than the ones with zero cost of
entry. There exists a c. such that if c < c., there exists a unique equilibrium with positive
entry. If c. < c < c*, there are exactly three equilibria, of which only two are stable.
Proof. See Appendix. m
To understand Proposition 5, note that the value of Xus(M) depends on the ratio M/N.
The first best action can be achieved when A*'I* 2 -4 2 N < M <N; this is
the case where the market is very balanced. In this region, an increase in the number of
upstream firms does not change the surplus in the relationship but decreases the value of
XUs(M) because it makes it harder for an upstream firm to be matched with a downstream
firm (also increasing the share of the surplus captured by downstream firms).
When M > A*A-RN, first best actions can no longer be achieved: the market is
imbalanced due to too many upstream firms. In this region, an increase in the number of
upstream firms decreases Xus(M) in two ways. First, it is harder for an upstream firm to be
matched with a downstream firm. Second, it makes the relationship more difficult to sustain
and decreases total surplus.
Finally, when M < A*+vA*4N an increase in the number of upstream firms has two
opposing effects. On the one hand, again it is harder for an upstream firm to be matched with
a downstream firm and this effect decreases Xus(M). On the other hand, more upstream
firms makes the market more balanced and this can increase the total surplus in relational
contracts. This second effect increases the value of Xus(M). It is possible for the second
force to dominate, so Xvs is increasing over some range.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between Xus and A (which is increasing in M)
when.r = 0.1, E = 0.1, and q2 = 0.6.At low levels of entry, the returns to US firms are
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increasing in the number of US firms in the market, and we observe multiple equilibria for a
broad range of entry costs c.
Proposition 5 suggests a novel rationale for big-push policies. When there are too few US
firms entering the market, coordination will be important in pushing the economy over the
entry hurdle, and the government may consider subsidizing entry in order to escape the low-
entry equilibrium. However, free entry can be inefficient in this model. When the number of
US firms is already high, further entry may unbalance the market, diminishing the surplus
in relational contracts. This negative externality is not taken into account by entering US
firms. Thus while the model stresses the potential for a government role in ensluring market
balance, policy-makers may have a difficult time knowing in which direction to push.
5 Input Ownership
In this section, we study one mechanism-input ownership-that parties can use to compensate
for a market structure that inhibits relational contracts. While the optimality of different
ownership structures has been studied extensively in the literature, the focus has typically
been on other types of ownership. The central right embodied in ownership of a firm and
its assets is most often taken to be the right to make decisions about the production process
(Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Baker, Gibbons & Murphy (2006)).
That is, ownership means that an agent gets to decide how much to produce, what inputs to
use and who will undertake individual stages of production (e.g., marketing). This aspect of
ownership is typically described as residual control rights. Alternatively, the central element
of ownership can be viewed as a legal claim on output. In this conception, ownership of a
firm confers the ability to unilaterally sell the firm's output and appropriate the revenue.
In Baker, Gibbons & Murphy (2002), for example, ownership of an upstream firm by a
downstream firm limits the former party's wasteful attempts to increase the assets sale value
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to alternative buyers but tempts the downstream firm to take the output without paying
promised bonuses. We term this aspect output ownership.
A third and less studied aspect of ownership is control over inputs that enhance produc-
tivity. Control over such inputs confers the critical ability to dissolve the current relationship
and continue the game with a new partner; lack of control means that future relationships
will be less productive. We term this third dimension input ownership, and it is the focus
of this section." These three elements of ownership are often tied together but need not
be. Shareholders, for example, have strong claims on output but much weaker control rights
and limited ownership of inputs (though they do own the firms' brand name). An employee
who develops strong, personalized relationships with clients may have a high level of input
ownership-she can plausibly leave the firm and take its clients with her-but few control
rights and no claim on output.
Abstracting from control rights, we can expand the distinction between employment and
outsourcing into a two-by-two matrix with four possible (relational) ownership structures:
Upstream Downstream
owns output owns output
Upstream owns input Outsourcing Cottage Industry
Downstream owns input Licensing Employment
In what we classify as a typical employment relationship, the employer (downstream
firm) owns the rights to both output and most inputs; the typical outsourcing relationship
is characterized by complete separation of the two firms, with the upstream party owning
both output and inputs. However, two intermediate ownership forms are also possible. We
denote the situation in which the downstream firm owns output but the "employee" owns his
own inputs as cottage industry, though it could equally refer to an employee with important
"In Halonen (2002), "ownership" covers both output and inputs, but these rights cannot be separated.
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human capital that is alienable ex ante but not ex post (e.g., personalized relationships with
clients). We denote the reverse situation, with the upstream firm owning its own output but
borrowing inputs from the downstream firm as licensing (e.g., the downstream firm might
own a patent that it licenses to the upstream firm). In this section, we begin the process of
extending the analysis of optimal ownership structures to the four cases listed above. 1 2
5.1 Model Setup
We return to the model in section 3 with exogenous participation on both sides of the market.
Consider a unique upstream party, called the Entrepreneur, who owns an input.13 To fix
ideas, suppose that this input is a patent that decreases the cost of production by some
constant amount z. With the input, the value of production to a downstream party is
QH + z with probability q(a)
QL + z with probability 1 - q(a)
and the value to the outside market is
PH + z with probability p(a)
PL + z with probability 1 - p(a)
We abstract from the process of innovation and assume that the patent is unique, with no
further patent development being possible. The Entrepreneur meets downstream firms with
the same frequency as other upstream firms. When the Entrepreneur meets a downstream
'
2 For ease of exposition, we continue to refer to contracts where US owns the output as relational out-
sourcing when input ownership is not at issue. Similarly, we continue to refer to contracts where DS owns
the output as relational employment.
13The analysis is the same if the initial owner of the input is a downstream firm.
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firm, they negotiate a relational contract that specifies a base payment s, bonus payments
{bij}, output ownership oo,t E {US, DS} and ownership of the input op, E {US,DS}.
Neither party is liquidity constrained.
At the end of any period where separation has occurred, the owner of the input has
the right to carry it into the matching market and use it in his next match. However!€the
separating parties can engage in bargaining over the asset, where the bargaining process
leads to a payment of 7rk when the purchasing party is of type k and a receipt of 7rk - CT
by the selling party. We interpret CT as a reduced-form bargaining cost; it might arise from
direct transaction costs (e.g., government fees for title transfer), asymmetric information
(e.g., Matouschek, 2004), or general haggling costs (Williamson, 1975; Klein, Crawford &
Alchian, 1978). In most of this section, we assume that M < N, so that the upstream firms
are the short side of the market. This means that the input is worth more to an unmatched
upstream firm than to an unmatched downstream firm. When o1n = US, there will be no
ex post bargaining over ownership of the input, while when orn = DS bargaining occurs for
sufficiently small CT.
Finally, we continue to assume that separation is more efficient than static production
following a deviation.
5.2 Input Ownership and Replacement Costs
In this setup, input ownership affects relational contracts through its effect on replacement
costs. When oi, = US, there is no ex post bargaining, and so replacement costs have the
same form as in section 3:
(2 - A)(1 + r)R = Ro ( + (s + z)2(r + e) + (1 - E)A
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where sR is the per period surplus of a relational contract for pairs without an input. When
oln = DS, the parties suffer an additional replacement cost after separation-either DS keeps
the input and receives less value from it than US or they jointly pay the transfer cost CT.
In the former case, the joint loss is
O(r, Aus, ADS) = (1r)Aus (U - US + r)ADS - UDS) > 0
r + Aus T + ADS
where Uk is the utility of a type k who owns the input at the moment when he finds a match.
For the remainder of this section, we assume that CT
is always less than O(r, Aus, ADS). This assumption simplifies the calculations but does not
substantively affect the results. When oln = DS, then, total replacement costs are
R - Ro + CT
This leads to our next result:
Proposition 6 When ex post bargaining over asset ownership is efficient (CT = 0), input
ownership is irrelevant.
The proof follows immediately from the fact that R is the same for oIn = US and
on = DS, since input ownership affects relational contracts solely through R. Intuitively,
we might expect that stronger relational contracts can be sustained by giving the input to the
weaker (downstream) party. In that way, the downstream party is dissuaded from reneging
through his difficulty in finding a replacement and the upstream party is dissuaded by the
fact that he will have to purchase the input if he is to carry it into his next relationship.
With efficient ex post bargaining, input ownership allows the parties to transfer reneging
temptation across one another. However, the relational contracts or section 2 already allow
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for full transferability of reneging temptation, so only factors that affect the sum of reneging
temptations matter. When CT = 0, input ownership has no effect on this sum.
Under inefficient ex post bargaining, R is higher when the input is owned by the down-
stream firm. This has both a positive and a negative effect: it can allow the parties to
sustain more efficient relational contracts by discouraging deviations, but it imposes higher
costs when separation occurs along the equilibrium path. The optimal input ownership
structure maximizes the (stock) surplus from the relational contract
1
SR = (SR + z) + 1 [(1 - C)SR + e(SR - R)] (19)
1+r
l+r+ e
- + (S(R) + z) -(
r r
where s5R(R) > 0.
An immediate result is that the upstream firm will own the input if first best production
is attainable under that structure. We restrict further analyses to a special linear-quadratic
case of the model.
5.3 A Linear-Quadratic Special Case
In this subsection, we assume that
q(a) = a,
p(a) = a2
1 12
c(a) = -a2 +1a
Following BGM (2002), we further assume that relational incentive contracts take the
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linear form
bij = b± + 0j
and define Ab = bH - bL and A/ = /OH - L. In this case, optimal actions for the upstream
firm are
= Ab
a2 = AO
and the first best can be attained if
FB
a1
aFB
2
=AQ
= 0
5.3.1 Downstream Ownership of Output
When replacement costs are a binding constraint, the optimal relational employment contract
solves
max AQal
Ab,A•p
1 1
- -a 1 - a2
2 2
subject to
al = LAO
a2 = A/3
< R
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AbJ + JA01
Clearly the optimal contract has APRE = 0 and AbRE = R, so surplus per period is
SRE(R) = QL+AQR-1R22
= QL + 1AQ22
where QL + 2AQ is first best surplus.
5.3.2 Upstream Ownership of Output
In this case, the optimal contract solves
max AQal
Ab,A/
1 2 1
- -a a
2 1-2
subject to
a 2 = AO
1 1
-AQ + 46--AR2 2
There is no gain to setting Ab < AQ or A, > LAP, so the last constraint can be rewritten
as
Ab - A0 < R + 1 1
-AQ - -AP2 2
When R > !(AQ + AP), first best is attainable. If not, the solution to this program
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if R < AQ
if R> AQ
< R
depends on the sign of AQ - AP. If AQ > AP, then
AbRO
A3RO
3 1 1 1
= min{-AQ-AP+-R, AQ+R
4 4 2 2
1 1 1 1
= min{-AQ + -AP - -R -AP}4 4 2 '2
while if AQ < AP,
3
= max{-AQ
4
1
= max{-AQ
4
1 1 1
- -AP+ -R, -AQ}4 2 2
1 1 1
+ -AP- -R AP - R}4 2 2
(In each case, we get the first elements inside the brackets whenever R > IAQ - AP I and
the second elements otherwise.)
Some tedious calculations then show that
sRO(R) = sFB
if R > 1 (AQ + AP),
SAQ 2
16
1
8
1
1 A
16
1
+ (AQ + AP)R -4
if (AQ + AP) > R > IAQ - API, and
sRO(R) = QL 3+ -AQ28
1 28
1 1
+ - max{AQ, AP}R - R22 2
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AbRO
sRO(R) = QL + -R24
if R I< 1 AQ - API.
5.3.3 Optimal Output Ownership
Proposition 7 Suppose R < min{AQ, ½(AQ + AP)}, so that first best is unattainable.
When A <, sRO > SRE. When 1 < - 3 - , RO > SRE if R/AQ < f( A) , where
()= I + (X- 1)2
and and sR0 < SRE otherwise. When 3 - Vf < •- < > R if R/Q <
where
x2 - 3
g(x) = X4(x - 2)
and sRo < SRE otherwise. When >- V, sRO < SRE
Proof. See appendix. m
From Proposition 3, we know that higher replacement costs increase surplus faster when
output is owned by the downstream firm; the above result reflects this fact. Figure 2 displays
the surplus generated under each output ownership structure as a function of R (for para-
meters QL = AQ = 1 and AP = 1.5). Total surplus from relational contracts is the upper
envelope of surplus from relational outsourcing (the green line) and surplus from relational
employment (the red line). 14
5.3.4 Incorporating Input Ownership
14The non-concavity of sR(R) at the point where optimal output ownership switches is a generic feature
of the model.
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Because optimal output ownership depends on R and input ownership affects R, the two
ownership decisions are not separable-when M/N < 1, downstream input ownership raises
R and makes downstream output ownership more attractive. This fact suggests that there
is a benefit to studying input and output ownership jointly. Figure 3 illustrates the interac-
tion between input and output ownership, displaying the optimal ownership structure as a
function of AP and Ro (with QL = AQ = 1, E = r = 0.25 and CT = 0.15).15 Two features
are worth noting. First, there is a general tendency for upstream output ownership to occur
when AP is small and upstream input ownership to occur when replacement costs are high;
the latter stems from the fact that sR(R) is concave over the bulk of its range (so that
the benefit of increasing replacement costs by assigning the input to the downstream firm
are typically decreasing in Ro). Secondly, over the intermediate rage of AP where neither
output ownership regime is always dominant, we often see switching from employment to
outsourcing as replacement costs decrease; this reflects the effect of replacement costs on
output ownership described in Proposition 3. Finally, when replacement costs are in the
neighborhood of 0.25 and AP is roughly 1.55, the region where Employment is optimal
"juts into" the the Outsourcing region. This irregular shape reflects the interaction between
input and output ownership described above: low replacement costs induce the parties to
assign the input to DS, which in turn induces them to assign output ownership to DS as well.
6 Conclusion
This paper places the study of optimal relational contracts and ownership structures into a
market context, where the two sides of the market are asymmetric in their replaceability. We
argue that market structure can play a key role in determining replacement costs, which in
1 5Calculations behind Figure 3 are summarized in the Appendix.
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turn affect the set of sustainable relational contracts and the optimality of different ownership
structures. We then explore two extensions to the basic model. When market entry is
endogenous, we find that the mechanism studied here can lead to a novel source of multiple
equilibria; this finding may have interesting applications to economic development. We also
examine the potential for matched partners to counteract market forces by using ownership
of inputs as a kind of hostage. We find that this strategy is feasible only when ex post
bargaining is inefficient and that optimal input and output ownership decisions are not
separable.
We believe that the basic approach adopted in this paper can be applied fruitfully to a
number of economic issues. For example, the model of input ownership potentially provides
a novel rationale for the protection of intellectual property. With no intellectual property
protection, investors and partners of innovating entrepreneurs might find themselves easily
replaced. This in turn encourages the entrepreneurs to take self-interested courses of action
and makes it more difficult for them to find a partner in the first place. Enforceable intellec-
tual property rights can be sold to investors, effectively making both parties hard to replace
and sustaining more efficient relational contracts."' However, it does not follow that patent
law should be as clear and as strong as possible. As this paper shows, assigning a patent to
the investor facilitates relational contracting only if ex post bargaining is inefficient. Insofar
as ambiguous patent rights encourage parties to expend resources in their attempts to claim
intellectual property rights (e.g., on legal fees), they can lower the sum of the parties' payoffs
following dissolution and support relational contracting. Thus while the high aggregate cost
of resolving patent uncertainty is often maligned, it may serve a useful function.
The model also points to an important role for credit constraints in hampering efficient
production. Throughout the paper, we abstract from liquidity concerns and assume that
the parties can make whatever upfront transfers are necessary to support the efficient allo-
16A similar argument applies to the enforcement of non-compete clauses in employment contracts.
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cation of assets. This may be a realistic assumption as long as we identify the replaceable
party (who purchases the asset) as an investor and the irreplaceable party as an entrepre-
neur. More generally, however, input ownership by the replaceable party means that the
long side of the market must make an up front payment to the short side of the market.
Since the short side of the market will receive a smaller surplus, we might expect it to be
particularly credit constrained. Market prices, then, will tend to lead naturally to wealth
distributions that hamper the efficient allocation of productive assets and optimal relational
contracts. Economies with poorly developed financial markets will be especially afflicted by
this problem.
Finally, we would like to highlight one important dimension along which the model can be
extended. Following Macleod and Malcomson (1998), we have assumed the current players'
histories are not observable to any replacements. In some situations this assumption may
be realistic, but in other cases agents from one side of the market form institutions to share
their experiences with past partners (e.g., credit ratings, social networks among venture
capitalists). These institutions make the agents harder to replace and therefore potentially
reduce the importance of assets as hostages. The role of different observability assumptions,
particularly in combination with imperfect public monitoring of partners' actions, is worth
exploring in future work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5: Suppose (1-E)( < q 2 < (r+)+(1-e) 2)) Then there exists a c* such
that if the entry cost c > c*, no US firms enter other than the ones with zero cost of entry.
There exists a c. such that if c < c., there exists a unique equilibrium with positive entry.
If c. < c < c*, there are exactly three equilibria, of which only two are stable.
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Proof. When (r+e)+(1-e)) < q2 < (2(r+e)+(1-E)(1+e 2 )) , whether the first best can be achieved
depends on the value of A. It can be shown that there exists A* = 2 +-2+ such that
if A < A*, then the first best action can be sustained and otherwise it cannot. Therefore,
summarizing the discussion above, we have
1 A+ vA 2 - 4 2 (2 (S+(2(1 + r)q2
2rq2 2(2 - A)
Sq2 (1(+r)2 (A+ A2 -4E 2) if
4r 2(r + e) + (1 - E)A
1 A- A2 - 4E 2(2(1+r)q 2
r (2(12(2+ r)q A)
2rq2 2(2 - A)
2(r + e) + (1 - e)A A* - /A 2 - 42N;
2 - Aif 2
A* - vA*2 - 4E2  A* + /A* 2 - 4e2
N < M < N;2E 2E)
2(r + E) + (1 - E)h A* + h*2 - 4E2 N
2) if M > N.2-- 2e
It is easily seen that if M > A*A*-4N, we must have dXus(M)/dM < 0. Therefore,
we are interested in the case when M < A*-4N. In this case, we have
1 A+ JA-~ 42 2 2(r + ) + (1 - E)AXus(A) = 2 A+ A 2 (2(1 + r)q2 -
2rq2  2(2 - A) 2 - A
S 2  (2-) 2  (2(1 + r)q2 (2 - A) - 2(r + e) -(1 - E)A)4rq (2 - A)2
= 1 rq2  + 2 - 4 2 (4(1 + r)q2 - 2(r + e)) - (2(1 + r)q2 + (1 - e))A4rq2 (2 - A) 2
1 A+ x/A 2 -4c 2
1 (A - BA), 174rq2  (2 - A) 2  (A-BA),
where A- 4(1+ r)q2 - 2(r + e) , and B - 2(1+ r)q2 +(1 - e). Note that A = 2B - 2(1+ r).
Taking the derivative with respect to A, we have
d( (A - BA)
dA
(1±+ )A (2 - A) 2 + 2(A +
(1+A ) ý-4+ (2 - A)4
A + vA 2 -4e 2
-B (2 - A)2
A + A-42 -4e 2  1
(2 - A)2 [(A 2 - 4E2
vA2 - 4e2)(2 - A) - BA)
(A - BA)
2 )(A - BA) - B].2 - A
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Xus(M)
There are two cases to consider now. First, if A - BA < 0, i.e. A > 1, we must have
dA+VA4 4(A-BA)
(2-A) 2  
< 0.dA
Now suppose instead that A < ý. In this case, we have
dA 2-4 2 (A - BA)(2-A)2
dA
A + v'A2 -4E 2 A-BA
(2 - A) 2  A2 - 4g2
< 0,
AB BA
+ 2B B B]2 - A
where the inequality follows because A+ -4 > 0A-BA decreases with A,
decreases0,withreAsbecause A
A A
and B- also2-A
decreases with A because = 2(1 - ) < 2.
This implies that there exists M* such that Xus(M) is strictly increasing in M for
M < M* and Xus(M) is strictly decreasing in M for M > M*. The rest of the proof follows
easily.
Q.E.D. .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 7 Suppose R < min{AQ, I(AQ + AP)}, so that first best is unattainable.
When a 1, s RO > RE . When 1 < p < 3 - v", sR oAQ - AQ > sRE if R/AQ < f(-) , where
1+Jf(x) = 1 (x - 1)2
and sRO < SRE otherwise. When 3 - \ -F <K < V3, sRO > sRE if R/AQ < g(-Q),> AQ
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where
x2 - 3
4(x - 2)
and sRO < SRE otherwise. When >Ž v 0, sRO < sRE
Proof. Let x for notational simplicity.
CASE 1: < 1. First suppose that ½(AP + AQ) > R> (AQ- AP). Then
sRO(R) - SRE(R) = R2 +4 4p -4 AQ)R4 SAQAP-8+(16 Q216 1-p 2 )16 (20)
which has roots
3 1R = -AQ- -AP2 2
1
+ IAQ - AP|
JZ
(21)
With A <1 and ½(AP+AQ) > R > (AQ-AP), it can be verified that sRO(R) _ SRE(R)
is always positive. If R _< (AQ - AP), we have2~lq 1/ V IV
sRO(R) _- SRE(R) = 2
8
!AP2 1
p2 - 1 AQR8 2
which is always positive for R K (AQ - AP). Thus sRO(R) > SRE(R) in this case.
CASE 2: 1 < < 3 - v.First suppose that AQ >AQ - R > (AP - AQ).
sRo(R) - SRE(R) is again determined by equation 20 and is positive when R is smaller than
the lower root. The lower root can be rewritten as f( )AQ.
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Then
Suppose that R < 1 (AP - AQ). Then
3 1 1
sRO(R) _ SRE (R)2 _ p2 + (AP - AQ)R8 8 2
which is always positive over the relevant range of R.
First suppose that AQ > R > (AP - AQ).
sRo(R) - sRE(R) is again determined by equation 20.
(22)
Then
Since R is always larger than the
lower root over this range, sRO(R) < sRE(R).
Next suppose that R !(AP - AQ) Then sRO(R) - sRE(R) is determined by equation
22.Based on this equation, sRO(R) > SRE(R) iff
AP 2 - 3AQ 2R <
4(AP - 2AQ)
Z2 - 3
= AQ
4(x - 2)
= g(x)AQ
In the range 3 - v2 < x < v, R < g(x)AQ < AQ - API and so there is indeed a
critical value Rswitch = g(x)AQ such that sRo(R) - sRE(R) > 0 if and only if R < Rswitch.
CASE 4: -P -> v\. First suppose that AQ > R > !(AP - AQ); then the same logic as
in Case 3 applies and we have sRO(R) < SRE(R) over the entire relevant range.
If R < (AP - AQ) and -P < 2, then sRO (R) > sRE(R) iff R < g(x)AQ, but this is
impossible because it can be verified that (AP - AQ) Ž g7r)AQ.
When a 2 inspection of 22 reveals immediately that s8R(R) < sRE(R).
Finally, suppose that R < I(AP - AQ) and a > 2. Then equation 22 implies that
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CASE 3: 3 - v'2 < A < v.AQ
s"O(R) > sRE(R) if and only if
Ap 2 - 3AQ 2
R>
4(AP - 2AQ)
= g(x)AQ
However, we can show that g(x)AQ > AQ for x > 2, so that the above condition can never
be satisfied where the first best is unattainable:
2g - 3 - 4(x - 2)g(x)- 1 = 4(x -2)
x2 - 4x + 5
4(x - 2)
> 0
Q.E.D. .
A.3 Calculations for Figure 3
Assume that QL = AQ = 1 and e = r = 1. Based on Proposition 7, we have the following:
CASE 1: AP < 1, so that the input should go to the downstream firm when
sRO(Ro + CT) - sRO(Ro) > CT
l+r
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Subcase A: When Ro + CTr • (AQ - AP), this becomes
3 1
R < - CT10 2
Subcase B: When Ro > (AQ - AP), this becomes
3 1
Ro < + AP10 2
1
-C T2
Subcase C: When Ro _< (AQ - AP) < Ro + CT, this becomes
R2 + [AP - 1 - 2CT]Ro + 1 4-(1 -AP)2 + (1+ AP)CT - CT4 5
CASE 2: 1 < A _ < 3 -v.AQ -
Subcase A: When Ro + CT ! ½(AP - AQ), upstream owns the output regardless of input
ownership and so the input should go to the downstream firm when
3
Ro < -10
1
-CT2
as in Case lA.
Subcase B: f () >f (-Q Ro + CT > Ro > !(AP - AQ). Upstream again always owns the
output, and the rule for input ownership is the same as in Case 1B:
3
Ro < +10
1AP -
2
1
CT2
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Subcase C: Ro < !(AP - AQ) < Ro + CT < f (-). The rule is the same as in Case 1C:
1 4
R + [AP- 1- 2CT]R + (1 -AP) 2 (1 + AP) C T - -CT- T > 04 5
Subcase D: Ro > f (A). In this case, output is always in the hands of the downstream firm,
who gets the input as well when
SRE(Ro + CT) - SRE(RO) > -CT1+r
4 1Ro < --- CT5 2
Subcase E: !(AP - AQ) < Ro < f(-) < Ro + CT. In this case, output goes to the
downstream firm iff the input also goes to the downstream firm. The downstream firm gets
both when
S E(Ro + CT) - SRO(RO)
1 7AP - CT]Ro - [4 16
1AP -8
1 p2
16
6 1
+ 2CT + I- ]5 2
> 6CTl+r
> 0
Subcase F: Ro • !(AP - AQ) < f(A) < Ro + CT (This case is unlikely to arise if CT is
"small.") Again, input and output ownership go together, but now downstream gets both
when
1
Ro[1 - CT - AP]2
3
>- 8
4 1
-CT+ I-CT5 2
It can be shown that 1 - CT- !AP < 0 whenever CT _ f( ) - !(AP - AQ) and
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1 2SR4 0
3
+[
4
1
-AP -8
1 < p 3 - V. Thus we give both input and output to the downstream firm when
AP + CT 1
CASE 3: 3 - v < -P< .
Subcase A: When Ro + CT 5 g() < (AP- AQ), the upstream firm always gets the
output, and so we follow the same rule as in Case 1A:
3
Ro < 010
1
CT2
Subcase B: When g(A) < Ro, the downstream firm always gets the output, and so we
follow the same rule as in Case 2D:
4 1Ro < -- CT5 2
Subcase C: When Ro • g( ) < Ro + CT, input and output ownership go together, and we
follow the same rule as in Case 2F:
2 + 1Ap + 4AC T T
Ro < 8 8+AP + CT-
CASE 4: A > V/3. Output is always assigned to the downstream firm, and so the rule
is the same as in Case 2D:
164
1
-1CT2
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4
Ro < 55
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